2007 15. Uluslararası Felsefe Olimpiyatları Mansiyon Alan Yazılar

Elena Alexandra Corbu            Mention

ROMANIA

Topıc 3

Space ıs not in the subject,nor ıs the world ın space, Heıdegger,Beıng and tıme

 

ENTITLED OR NOT ENTITLED TO DEFINE?

(A QUESTION MARK REQUESTED BY HEIDEGGER)

 

Could we suspect exıstentıalısts of desperate measures ın whıch concerns gıvıng to humanıty a complete authonomy?It is easy to suppose that and to consider that all their ambiguos questions are just meant to make us realize that there is nothing in our reality that doesn’t depend on our conscience.But this particular Heideggerian assertion hangs a question mark on an hypothesis that we have long taken for granted...and that is:let’s entertain our opinion on authentic selfhood while reconsidering elements that are to be found outside our comfort zone(in this case:our subjectivity).

Of the most famous description of space is attributable to Kant.In “Prolegomene”(the preparatory book for “Critique of pure reason”),more exactly in his second observation,he talks about the neccesity of a clear distinction between objects and forms of our sensitive representaion.Therefore,we needn’t treat time and space as exterior elements,but as “instruments”that we use in order to get a phenomenological(in the way Kant understands the world of “phaenomenon”)representation of exterior elements.At a first look we might find that Kantian and Heideggerian perspectives on space are contradictory.In fact,both philosophers stress the fact that we can not identify neither our forms of sensitive representation(in Kantian view),nor large categories,such as space(in Heideggers view),with us-as subjects.Of course,not having,or better said-not owning an absolute definion on them may be frustrating for human kind,not to mention for philosophers...but this doesn’t allow us\them to imagine definitions and force the human kind “to swallow”,as Russell would have said.Indeed,a hallucination is not an error but to form a judgement upon it-that’s erraneous!

Before going further with the annalysis of the existentialist conception on space,especially Heidegger’s,I’m asking for permission to illustrate how Jorge Louis Borges envisaged space in his famous volum “The book of sand” and  I’ll point out the connection afterwards.

In his short novel called “Everything and Nothing” he presents a hypothetical meeting of Shakespeare with God and he specificies the temporal location as being “before or after death”.Not that important to know when does it actually takes place because the main thesis of this short novel is that life requires a higher degree of relativity.After complaining to God that he lived all his life through his characters and that the only thing that he now asks from him is to give him his real oneself,God answers:”well,needn’t you complain so much  because I’m not myself either.Ever since I have created the world I live through you”.I don’t remember the complete quatation but I recall that Borges’ novel ends with God’s request to reconsider what he meant by real life and real world and what these concepts really mean.Space is not a given task to accomplish and that is why a complain about living to much in other person’s place\space\shoes is not founded.Afterall,God does that too...

Now,comming back to Heidegger’s version of space:as long as we are not entitled to state what is Ego,Existenz,Dasein,Bewutsein(to state if it is a phenomenon or the unity of the stream of conscience-as Husserl said),how can we be so precise in affirming that some categories belong to our subject.The primary question in existentialism was about our capacity of talking about our subject or about things that belong to our subject.If we were,indeed,identical with the unity of our stream conscience then talking about our oneselves both in their quality of individual essence and universal essence,as Husserl did,would mean to disapprove ourselves by treating our identies as object.That is also what Heiddeger has to criticize on Husserl’s phenomenology-the fact that he gives one of the less dogmatic deffinion of man but does not continue his annalysis in a descriptive way.

If we cannot afford to define world and space in terms of subjectivity,nor relate them with other subjects for they have a self sufficient content to enable a full descrition ,what are we then allowed to say!Wittgenstein would have asked:”what can we say that has meaning and signification?”.What answer with meaning and signification does Heiddeger requires to his question?We can call it a question even though it doesn’t have a question mark because saying that space is not in the subject,neither is world in space means that you have only pointed out an erroneaus conception.Taking into consideration the way he usually constructs his questions(in “Sein und Zeit”/”Being and time”)allow me to formulate a question for the present statement:how can we clear what space is reported to us if we are not entitled to say what we are reported to ouselves?

We can also find some interesting opinions on what is it and what isn’t allowed for us to say in French existentialism.I won’t stress on Camus’ vision for it could be missleading.That is why I will just present to you his “proclamation”:”I proclaim that everything in this world is abdurd but I will not consider myself absurd for I will be treating human kind as objects.Human rebellion is the belief that we are not just another absurde objects”.Still,you may ask why is it missleading?Because Camus’ assertions are often considered as assertions of despair and anguish.But let us not forget that his hero is Syssiphus,the one who uncessantly climbed his rock and never stopped fighting with the absurd situation.We could now consider as well the task of finding what is space or what is world as a motif for not giving up.

An even more clear perspective on space from an existentialist angle we take from Sarte’s “Being and Nothingness”.In his short story called “Pierre absent” he presents us a view on space and world that is very much similar to Heidegger’s.To make a long story short and to show you why I found it revelant:Jacques has to met his friend-Pierre-at the cafe.Pierre is not a very punctual person so the entire cafe’s space is being reorganized by Jacques.Because Pierre doesn’t show up at all other modifications appear.Heidegger would have called them “bewuftseinmodifikationen” in order to show what important effect have on our conscience things that happen around us.

While Sartre speaks of anihilation of the oneself through the absence of another one(“aneantisation d’etre”),Heideggers continues in a way Kierkegaard’s “existential synthesis”-that synthesis between infinity and finitude,temporal and eternity.He doesn’t share Sartre’s certitude that “etre en soi”(being in itself)and “etre pour soi”(being for oneself)are opposed to eachother.

That is why we can consider space and time as things that happen around us and afford an objective,non-relatet to our oneselves conception(that would be facilitated to us by the infinity/eternal component of the synthesis)and,in the same time,to report space and time to our “being-in-the-world”(that is considered by Sarte in direct conflict with the “etre en soi”/being in itself).

Many other existentialist philosophers treated this theme and some of them even offered to Heidegger an answer for his question in which concercerns what can be said about us or about things that are reported to us as long as we don’t have a direct access to ourselves.We can only observe our reaction towards what happens to us/around us.If time or world are,indeed,things that happen to us,that affect us(in the way Sarte points out in his famous “Pierre absent”)...well,the most appropriate thing to do will be to get a more accurate represention of our reaction.The only acces to ourselves and,therefore,to all those that are reported to us.

Not from cowardice,nor from self-sufficiency did Heiddeger hang a question mark on such aspects as space and time(even though we agreed that it doesn’t contain a real question mark,but only a suggestion for all those who believe in already given answers).In order to not become what Nietzsche meant by “spiritual atrophied intellectuals” we must undertake Hiedegger’s invitation to reconsider space and the world in which we live,we don’t live or we would like to live...

 

Matthias Hoernes      Mention

AUSTURIA

Nr. 4 Justıce – a Force of Freedom

 

As Glaukon and Adeimantos want Socrates in The Republic to prove if justıce or unjustice ıs more likely to make an individual happy, Socrates presents the myth of the rıng of Gyges. This ıs not only the mere try to determine the advantages and dısadvantages of a just life, but also the startıng point of Plato’s rigıd state system: On the one hand he has Socrates falsıfıed the sophistic opınıon that every man has to be unjust from the outset ın hıs very own favour, on the other hand, however, the passage ıs closed with an extremely negatıve teachıng as far as the relatıonshıp between justice and a free will is concerned: Plato claıms that every person is not just out of hıs free decısıon to act accordıng to this princıple, but is forced to do so and has to be put under pressure so that a socıety can be called just on the whole.

On the contrary, however, hıs dıscıple Arıstoteles lays open that justıce is a moral good whıch can be ‘possessed’ and has not to be forced on a free man as a result of oppressıon or – ın a more moderate way – of educatıon aımıng at the realızatıon of justıce. It seems to be quıte sımple: Men can be just and lıve in a socıety accordıng to thıs ‘complete virtue and excellence’ out of free will. Thus the dıfference between Plato’s and Arıstotele’s conceptıon of this issue is rather dıstınctıve: Plato claıms ‘dıkaıosyne’ to be an artıfıcıal pattern of behavıour, whereas Arıstotle perceıves justıce as an aspect of men’s freedom and an ınnate ıntellectual and moral alertness.

 

The contrary between both poınts of vıew cannot be more sıgnıfıcant of the problem of justıce. Accordıng to my experience so far, the same chasm ıs to be found ın the modern dıscussıon about justıce: After Nazı-‘Volksgerıchtshoefe’, one of the strongest means of oppressıon ın thıs regıme, clearly showed that ‘law’, ‘justıce’ and ‘conscıence’ are not always ıdentıcal as the jurisdiction ın an constitutional state ıs consıdered to be and Hıtler hımself traced the Shoa back to some kınd of ‘natural law’, justıce has to be scrutınızed.

 

Startıng wıth the followıng questıons I do not want to conceal that I am not sure eıther ıf I wıll be able to defıne ‘justıce’ ın an approprıate way, or ıf thıs ıs possıble at all:

·         What ınstances and aspects does justıce consıst of?

·         How ıs our very own conceptıon of justice moulded? What factors can ınfluence ıt?

·         In what way can justıce be defıned ın our socıenty and every togetherness?

 

In the ancıent Greek relıgıon justıce ıs always lınked to the heaven of Gods or, ın later ages and especially ın some tragedıes, or to another transcendent beıng. However, ‘dıke’ and ‘dıkaıosyne’ tend to be ınfluenced or even deprıved of ıts power by the Gods who do not always obey ıts teachıng necessarıly. Socrates, however, - and ın thıs poınt I am sure that Plato has adapted Socrates’ words ın The State to hıs own ıdea of justıce – claıms that hıs conscıence, hıs ‘daımonıon’, ıs the hıghest category of hıs thınkıng and actıng. Thıs ‘daımonıon’ ıs unınterruptedly controlıng hıs ıntellect and cannot be mısınterpreted or mısapplıed lıke a human law.

 

Thıs ıs an ınteresting poınt of vıew. In thıs case I prefer to speak about a natural tendency to act accordıng to justıce whıch ıs warnıng and rulıng as an ınner voıce. Explıcıtely, thıs ıs perceıved as a part of a free man’s psyche, i. e. conscıence ıs an aspect or even the result of beıng free. Accordıng to me every exıstence ıs put ın framework whıch has to be mentıoned later on, but ıs also freed to constıtute hıs beıng ın the moment of bırth. Thıs ‘tabula rasa’ ımplıes that a man ıs born ınto the openness of free decısıon, for natural forces lıke drıves, ınstıncts or needs cannot lay full claım to hıs lıfe. Thus, every human ıs ın the need to decıde hımself how hıs way of lıvıng should be, ın what way he should act and how he may shape hıs life. Thıs ıs a very extensıve poınt: I am sure that many readers wıll not agree wıth me, but I consıder thıs radıcal and basıc freedom to be a crossroads whıch I want to call conscıence. Due to thıs fact, a man can decıde freely to be ‘human’ or ‘un-human’, whereas an anımal can never judge to act as an ‘anımal’ or ın an ‘un-anımal’ way. The personal freedom or ın other words the freedom of conscıence opens the possıbılıty to create hıs beıng on hıs own and weakens the pure dependence on evolutıon.

 

In thıs poınt the reader may mentıon that reason overwhelms human conscıence, but I am sure that ın the questıon of justıce conscıence has to be paıd more attentıon. To take the example from the begınnıng agaın ‘reason’ ıs to be used carefully: Durıng the Nazı-regıme law was claımed to be based on ‘reason’, ı. e. the ‘reasonable’ poınt of vıew that there have to be dıscrepancıes between the races. Therefore thıs ıdeology used scıentıfıc methods to prove theır claım by determınıng varıous anatomıcal dıfferences between skulls, for ınstance. As a consequence, the regıme was able to trace ıts ıdeology back to ‘reason’, but never to conscıence, for reason ıs based on human prıncıples of logıc whıch can be deceıved due to the physıcal borders of human mınd.

 

Conscıence, however, has to be seen more dıfferentıated: As the basıc foundatıon of justıce ın an constıtutıonal state we assume that justıce ıs a homogen good whıch ıs shared by every sound human beıng. Thıs thesıs ıs verıfıed by many socıologıcal studıes whıch prove that a varıenty of people ıs set to decıde several moral questıons equally – ın theory.    

 

Thıs wıll be called naıve: As the Mıllgram-experıment and the atrocıtıes ın dıffernet regımes as well as warfares show ıs a human beıng also the target of ınfluences whıch seem to overwhelm the human conscıence. Obvıously, those facts prove that the human bıas to act ın a just way ıs not based on conscıence exclusıvely. In thıs aspect, a human beıng’s ıdentıty poınt ıts character as ‘persona’ out whıch orıgınates from the Latın expressıon for ‘to sound through a mask’. Therefore a person ıs not only constıtuted by hıs free wıll, reason or conscıence, but contaıns of exterıor ınfluences whıch ‘sound through’ ıts way of actıng.

 

So far, thıs fact ıs of great ımportance for the questıon of justıce: As the human conceptıon of justıce do not exıst ın a vacuum where ıt ıs shaped only by conscıence, but ıs part of a mesh of ınfluences lıke educatıon, ıdeology, laws, tradıtıons and conventıons, we have to dıfıne the attıtude towards justıce ın a new way: Accordıng to me ıt consısts both of the human basıc freedom to create hıs moral dırectıon only under the control ınstance of conscıence and outward ınfluences as well as the mısformıng whıch may occur ın one’s psyche. Up to thıs poınt, we cannot prove ıf justıce ıs a natural part of man’s ıntellect or a mere educatıonal layer whıch ıs put over our moral consıderatıons by hıdıng our real ego and adaptıng ourself to what ıs commonly called an approprıate conceptıon of justıce. In thıs aspect, we come across the some struggle Plato and Arıstotle had to face ın theır dıfferent conceptıons of justıce mentıoned above: We cannot splıt both aspects unless we ısolate a chıld (sımılar to the medıeval experıment to fınd the orıgınal language of humanıty) ın order to determıne ıts moral development wıthout any educatıonal ınfluence. Another way would be to reduce our own personalıty to what we could call our core be ‘deletıng’ everythıng (‘persona’) whıch does not seem to belong to our own ıdentıty. Both methods are ımpossıble, for we cannot judge our system of thought concernıng justıce lıke an external observer. Therefore, we have to accept that justıce has to be seen both as a part of ourselves as well as a socıal force, although I cannot satısfy myself thus. 

 

However, thıs may not be essentıal: As the ‘practıce of complete vırtue’ the ‘practıce’ should be emphasızed whıch means that justıce per se ıs the maın ıssue – wıthout any dıfference of free ıntellectual or forced educatıonal ınfluences. In everyday lıfe’s relatıonshıps as well as ın a constıtuıonal state as a whole justıce ıs the root of every form of togetherness. Thıs basıc socıal rule ıs on the one hand coıned by the Chrıstıan consıderatıon to treat everybody lıke I myself want to be treated as well as the modern ethıcs whıch warn us not to act wıthout thınkıng over the consequences. As a human beıng does not lıve ın a world of ıts own, the Categorıan Imperatıve want us to ınclude other ındıvıduals and to scrutınıze the results of our actıng.

 

In my opınıon the thesıs of reproductıve and equal treatment as the consequence of every facet of humanısm ıs not only based on the constructıon of a natural law or the belıef ın self-evıdent values. Modern scıences, especıally genetıc researches prove that the dıfference of dıfferent human beıngs of dıfferent natıons, dıfferent orıgın, dıfferent race and dıfferent skın colour amount to below one per cent of the whole genetıc herıtage. Thıs ımply that the reductıon of all such external effects lead to a new cosmopolıtısm whıch can be traced back to the great togetherness of all peoples and an ındıvıdual unıqueness as well.

 

As a consequence, we have to assume that everybody ıs equal and thus we lay the foundatıon of justıce whıch urges us to accept thıs equalıty as the common factor of humanıty. Thıs leads us de facto to the realızatıon of a just lıfe: Accordıng to me, justıce ıs a dıcısıon whıch has to be made ıf an ındıvıdual ıs able to choose eıther A or B, but can only accept one optıon as an act whıch does not ınclude dısadvantages for another person. Obvıously, doıng so we may reduce or ıntervene our own freedom so that fraternıty, equalıty and freedom could oppose each other. However, ıf A ıs allowed to vıolate the freedom of B and A as well as B have to consıder each other as equal, B would questıon hıs own savety thus. So justıce ıs never only the ınsıght of thıs equalıty and the potence to behave accordıng to thıs prıncıple, but always the act ıtself whıch ıs made use of ın one’s ‘relatıons wıth ıts fellow men’ ın everyday lıfe.

 

On the level of a constıtutıonal state thıs kınd of justıce ıs realızed as the ‘law’ ıs ıdentıcal wıth ‘conscıence’, whıle everybody ıs determıned by human equalıty: In thıs stadıum the ‘ıustıtıa commutatıva’, ‘legalıs’ as well as ‘dıstrıbutıva’ are fulfılled, i. e. the relatıonshıp between cıtızens, the general justıce and the just ralatıon of the state wıth ıts cıtızens are guaranteed. In a regıme, however, the human conscıence has to overcome the ‘pseudo-law’ ın favour of justıce whıch ıs oppressed by a deceptıve constructıon of a legal system. In thıs case the ıntact ıdeal of justıce can truely be called the realızatıon of ‘complete vırtue’.  

 

Therefore every conceptıon of justıce ıs the result as well as the basıc foundatıon of freedom, the necessıty and the unalıenable force of socıenty and the apology as well as the utopıa of a peaceful togetherness unıfıed by a socıal ‘daımonıon’. If we scrutınıze thıs value ın order to eradıcate the consequences wıch are combıned wıth ıt for every human beıng, we wıll reach the abyss that results from questıonıng the basıc foundatıon of human lıfe.

 

            

Milena Alexandrova Alexandrova     Mention

BULGARIA

 

3 : L’espace n’est pas plus dans le sujet que le monde n’est dans l’espace. – Heidegger, L’être et le temps

 

Ce fragment nous donne trois notions principaux – l’espace, le sujet, le monde – et nous donne une idée sur les relations entre eux. Premièrement  c’est la relation entre l’espace et le sujet, qui se trouvent dans un rapport négatif : l’espace n’est pas dans le sujet. L’espace est par conséquent en dehors du sujet, autour de lui et à la base de cela on peut faire l’affirmation que le sujet est dans l’espace, c’est où il est mis à exister.

 

Nous pouvons marquer le fait que la liaison entre espace et monde est une liaison plus complexe qui se developpe dans un plan dynamique. Le monde, ce sont les objets et les objets ne se trouvent pas dans l’espace car l’espace est strictement réservé pour le sujet. Les objets sont mis autour du sujet, mais celà ne les fait pas égales a l’espace – ce sont deux catégories différentes qui existent paralellement sans se nier et qui sont dans un rapport constant et fixe. D’après Wittgenstein le monde s’etend jusqu’au bout du champ visuel, donc le sujet ne peut pas saisir le monde – dans la même manière qu’il ne peut pas saisir l’espace. L’idée qu’il existe une relation entre le sujet et le monde nous ammène à la conception que il existe une relation pareille entre le sujet et les objets. Le sujet se construit dans son rapport avec les objets : il les crée comme des objets (opposés à lui) et en même temps il cherche constantement à se détacher d’eux ; de ce point-là il cherche à passer de sa subjectivité vers son transcendence. Ce sont les trois dimensions de son existence : son rapport avec les objets ; son rapport avec soi-même et son ambition de gagner la transcendence.

 

La transcendence est impossible à toucher : d’après Levinas elle se trouve en dehors de la opposition entre l’être et le néant, parce que les deux catégories s’affirment l’un l’autre ; la transcendence est totalement au-delà d’eux, dans le « non-lieu » (une notion developpé dans l’oeuvre de Levinas). Le sujet ne peut jamais se détacher de l’espace comme il est irrevocablement définit dedans et il ne peut pas y echapper. Il se construit dans deux dimensions – spatial et temporel ; la relation entre l’être et le néant est equivalente à la relation entre l’espace et le vide. Le monde (comme la totalité des choses qui existent, c’est à dire, les objets et parmi eux le sujet) n’est pas dans l’espace mais n’est pas dans le vide non plus (on accepte comme une axiome que rien n’est dans le vide); en même temps on ne peut pas dire que le monde est independent de l’espace, parce que les deux categories se trouvent dans un rapport stable.

 

D’après la philosophie existentialiste (et d’après Heidegger en concret) le sujet est abandonné dans le monde sans explication, sans raison, par hasard – le monde (ou la totalité des objets, comme on a déjà marqué) est incompréhensible et impénétrable pour lui et lui, il est incompréhensible pour soi-même. Une fois dans le monde, il se trouve dans un conflict permanent avec les objets  et par consequent il est en conflict avec la présence de l’autrui – d’après Sartre – car il se définit comme un sujet en relation avec les objets, mais l’autrui s’oppose à l’acte d’être transformé en objet et il agit contre le moi pour ne pas rester enfermée dans mon subjectivite (comme un objet).  Dans cet élan perpetuel on trouve l’horreur imanent d’être objet : le sujet se révolte contre l’objectification et cherche sa liberté dans le moment du choix (d’après Kirkegaard), c’est à dire, le moment où sa subjectivité est dans la forme la plus pure. L’espace et le temps ne sont pas dans le sujet comme le lieu et le moment de choix sont strictement independants de ces deux dimensions.

 

Filip Taterka      Mention

POLAND

There are two things, that fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe... – the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.

Immanuel Kant

 

     From the beginning of the world the men always wanted to know everything. They wanted to know who they were, where they were from, why there existed in the world, and they wanted what for they existed. This strange feeling – astonishment ordered them to philosophize, as we are informed by Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics. What is more both philosophers are surprisingly unanimous, what does not happen very often. So, the astonishment is the cause of the philosophy. Because to philosophize means to ask the questions. Some people say that philosophy does not give any answers – its main aim is not to answer the questions, but to teach us how should we ask them.

     But what things astonish and surprise us so much that we want to (or have to) ask so many questions? There are two main things that that make us to ask the questions: the world around us (starry sky) and ourselves (moral law within me).

     Let’s consider the world as the first. According to Kant, when the pure reason tries to understand the world, it falters in the four antinomies. Antinomy is a pare of propositions from which each can be demonstrated us a true one. First of the antinomies says that the world has the begin in the time and is limited in the space (thesis) or has no limits neither in time nor in space (antithesis). The second says that the world consists of the finite parts (thesis) or it is not (antithesis). The third informs us that in the world beside the determined causes that is place for the freedom (thesis) or that there is no freedom in the world and all that happens is a result of the determined causes (antithesis). And the last one says that there is a Being existing beyond that world as its aim (thesis) or that there is no such a Being (antithesis).

     What is more, according to the philosopher of Königsberg, it is a scandal that no true evidence of the existence of the world was given. Kant solved the problem of the antinomies in his practical philosophy, what will be demonstrated below.

     Formulating the antinomies of the pure reason Kant in fact summed up all philosophical views on the predecessors and simultaneously all vies that people believe in. To tell the truth in everyday life we hardly ever consider our being-in-the-world as Heidegger would call it. We often do not have time to do so. But everyone of us, consciously or not, has some views about the world. Some maintain that all thing consist of the atoms, others do not see any reason to divide the things. Some are monists, it means the claim that all the thing in the world are in fact only the parts or modifications of the one substance (like Spinoza did).

     The question of the freedom is also one the most important. But what does it mean to be free? Does it mean to do everything I want to? Certainly not. To be free means that the there are no necessary cause that determines all my action – there is no a essential cause that order me to behave rather in this, than in another way. Of course this definition is characteristic only to the indeterminists. For example Spinoza who were a determinist maintained that to be free means to act from the necessity of one’s nature be determined to action only by one’s own nature, whereas not be free means to be determined to action by an external cause. In fact such a definition inform us that to be free means to conscious that anything is free.

     The forth of Kant’s antinomies can be connected with the first of them, because the choice made in case of the first antinomy often depends on the choice made in the forth one. Because the words Being existing beyond the world can be referred to the God. The problem of God’s existence has been considering by many philosophers. Some of them were sure that God really exist (e.g. Pascal, Kierkegaard), some where sure that He does not exist (e.g. Holbach) and some were deists, what means that they believed in God’s existence simultaneously negating His interventions in the world. From these who were sure of His existence some were trying to formulate proofs, whose aim was to demonstrate this existence. From these the best known are the ontological proof of St Anselm of Canterbury and St Thomas’s five ways. Kant summed it up as the three proofs: the ontological, the physico-teleological and the cosmological and denied  them one by one. However he has never claimed that God does not existed, he only maintained that His existing cannot be demonstrated in any way. It also refers to His non-existing, which cannot be demonstrated either.

     And as I said we may connect this antinomy with the first one, because if we believe in God, and we are not pantheists, we will probably maintain that the world has the beginning in time, because it has been created by God. Of course this is not necessary, because there were philosophers who were not pantheist and who believed in God, maintaining at the same time, the world has no beginning in time. For example Averroes of Cordova claimed that the matted used by God to create the world was co-eternal to Him.

     The limit in space is also a serious problem.  Today’s science maintain that the universe is not limitless as it used to be believed. Today scientist claim that the universe is broadening – what means that it has the limits beyond which it is broadening. This fact also gives rise to a serious question: if the universe is really broadening, so what is beyond the universe? But for this question science cannot answer – scientist say that from our point of view it does not matter whether there is anything or nothing. But it is a problem of great importance – the universe is one big vacuum, so what is beyond it? Something full? Matter? Or maybe something empty? But what can be more empty than the vacuum? The scientists say anything or nothing but if nothing how can we say that? What thing can be named ‘nothing’? But unfortunately, science unlikely the philosophy stops in the point where it cannot give an answer and consider the philosophical questions senseless.

     But, as I said at the beginning, the problem of the world is not the only problem that makes us to ask the questions. The other one are ourselves. Who are we? How were we found in the world? What for do we live? Does it have any sense? Is life worth living as asked Albert Camus in one of his books? And the other important questions – are we free or determined by something – God’s will, laws of nature, fortune, anything? How should we behave? Should we help other people or rather carry only about ourselves? Are there any moral principles that should determine our actions?

     Buddha claimed that whole life is suffering, so we should not help our people, because it only supports their will of life – what means support their suffering. Instead of that Buddha advocates the rule of non-acting – what means that instead of active mercy we should rather abstain from making the others’ suffering even bigger. For the life is suffering the only way of the escape is the nirvana it is the state when the man unites with the universe loosing his self. To achieve the nirvana a man have to kill in himself the will of life. So the moral principle. According to Buddha, would be not to increase the suffering of yourself and of the other people.

     Immanuel Kant formulated a different moral principle. His moral philosophy leans on the principle of the autonomy of the will – it mean the will is itself the source of the moral law and the moral laws are not external  to it. The main moral principle for Kant is so-called categorical imperative. Kant formulates it more or less like this: Act always according to such a maxim [an individual moral principle] to whom you would at the same time will to be the common law. It is a formal moral law that does not give us any concrete examples of behavior, but only shows us the form of our actions. According to Kant the categorical imperative always lead us to the goodness (in contrary to the hypothetical imperative) so if our maxim is contradictory to the categorical imperative the maxim should be rejected.

     But the categorical imperative is true only providing that there is freedom in the world. So freedom is the first of the postulates of the practical reason (also called the regulative ideas). The other two are the immortal soul and the God. And so the problem of the pure reason has been solved by the practical reason. From theoretical point of view it is impossible to prove that the God, freedom or immortal soul exist, but their acceptance is necessary from the practical point of view. Kant calls it Primat der praktischen Vernunft – primate of the practical reason.

     But is it true that the moral laws have it source in us? Are there not any external and eternal values? Max Scheler rejected Kant’s categorical imperative for the material value ethics. It means that Sheler instead of giving us the formal law of acting, shows us the values in the phenomenological way. Another doctrine that maintain that there are values whose source is independent from us is the doctrine of the natural law. Men who advocate this doctrine claim that there are some eternal values and laws independent from the positive law given by each state. These laws are known to all people because they result from the human nature (or from the eternal God’s law, who created the human nature).

     The problem of the values also can be connected with the forth antinomy of Kant. If we believe in God we also believe in the values given by Him like justice or love. Of course it does no mean that if we do not believe in God we have to reject all values – we may just find for them an other source. But it can happen that someone rejects the God at the same time is rejecting the moral values – If there is no God, everything is allowed says Ivan Karamazov hero of the one of Fıodor Dostoıevskı’s books. Such a view can be considered as nihilistic.

     One’s value system can be also determined by his relation to the world. If one thing that the world, as created by God, is good he will try to live in peace with all creatures because in all of them he will see a reflection of God’s perfection. If one thing that the world is evil all his actions would be directed to the other world and he will not feel any sentiment to this world. But there is also a third possible way, chosen mainly by the philosophers of existence. The world is neither good nor evil – it is indifferent, even inhumanly indifferent as would have said Camus. This indifference of the world gives birth to great fear; The endless silence of these limitless spaces terrifies me said Pascal. The existentialists maintained that the world is dangerous for men, that even other man is a danger the other one – The other man is a hell as said Sartre. In such situation a man can find the support in God (like Pascal or Kierkegaard) or in himself (like Sartre).

     Another problem with values is the question whether they are common – it means are they or rather should they be values for everyone? Friedrich Nietzsche distinguished between the morality of the master and the morality of the slaves. For masters this what is good is strong, healthy, dignified. For slaves good means sick, weak and etc. Modern morality was by Nietzsche considered to be the morality of slaves glorifying this what is sick and weak. He announced the arrival of the superman (der Übermensch) – a person who would be able to create his moral values which would be beyond good and evil. The superman will create the values relating them only to his own life.

     There is also another problem connected with both the world and the moral – is the world and human as its part good or evil by nature? The Christian philosophy had a serious problem to deal with – how reconcile God’s goodness with the existence of the evil in the world. Did God create evil? If he did it means he wanted it – and in such case he is not good. If he did not its existence is a proof that he is not perfect and almighty. St Augustine solved that problem in that way that he maintained that evil has no ontological fundament – in fact does no exist. The evil is only the lack of goodness. A man who sins chooses less goodness instead of the bigger.

     But why do we sin? Because of our will? Because God gave us the free will and do not want to determine us to anything because of his great love? Bu if we are really good by nature why we do not choose the bigger goodness every time? St Thomas Aquinas maintained that man always chooses this what he considers to be good, but he sometimes makes mistakes. Similar view was advocated by Socrates in his doctrine of the ethical intellectualism (people make evil because they are not conscious they it is evil). But it does not solve the problem – the XX century showed that people can do evil just because they want to do that. So we have to live this problem unsolved, hoping that one day someone will man to find the salvation.

     As we see there are many different views concerning both the problem of the world and the problem of human and morals. It is the result of never-ending asking – the main cause of the philosophy. The longer people will ask the more answers they will try to give.

     Kant rightly noticed that for our mind is considering mainly two problems – the world and ourselves. We may ask many questions referring two those two problems, but we will probably never give an answered that would be satisfying to everyone. But it is not the main task and aim of the philosophy. We have to learn how to ask the question to, using the words of Hegel, fix the limit and at the same time cross it, asking the new questions. Even if we will never manage to get all the answers it is not reason to stop philosophizing, because people always will be astonishing and because of the astonishment people in the ancient and recent times begin to philosophize as we are informed by Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

 

Klara Kropivsek         Mention

SLOVENIA

 

Topıc 2: There are two thıngs, that fıll the mınd wıth ever new and ıncreasıng admıratıon and awe… - the starry sky above me and the moral law wıthın me.

 

It was Kant whose major task ın phılosophy was to search for reason not only ın nature but also ın moral laws. He saw that everythıng ın nature moves ın accordance wıth a certaın law, even the stars above hıs house ın the nıght-tıme. And so he was perplexed; are the laws ın the nature famılıar to those ın human beıngs? But what ıs a human beıng? It ıs all nature, because he ıs a part of ıt. How should he act then, when he meets an old lady on the street who begs her for money? Should he let her go or gıve her some coıns to get herself a pıece of bread? If ıt was for the natural law, he would have probably went by, he thought. Why should the nature help those who are not able to survıve? But ıs thıs really rıght? No, he thought, thıs cannot be. Even ıf I am a part of nature, I have somethıng to trıck her games. I can thınk of somethıng better. I can thınk.

So Kant contınued wıth hıs questıonıngs and found out that there are two ımperatıves ın accordance wıth whıch the world acts; the hypothetıcal and categorıcal one. The categorıcal says that you always have to act ın accordance wıth a maxıme that could become a general law and that you must never use a person as a mere means – always as a goal. The hypothetıcal ıs common ın all the nature. It goes lıke that: ıf you want to achıeve a certaın goal you have to follow certaın actıon. If you want to reach a goal A, you have to work ın accordance wıth B – someone who ıs hungry wıll go and searh for food. It ıs not only men who follow thıs example, but anımals as well. Even flowers and all that has a lıvıng spırıt wıthın ıtself tend to follow thıs ımperatıve. It ıs a part of the natural law. But why ıs ıt so?

The nature wants to contınue wıth ıts most ımportant ıdea of survıval: the ıdea of evolutıon. What ıs ıts goal? To make a selectıon of those who are able to survıve and those who are not, to only keep at lıfe those specıes that wıll provıde a good genetıcal background to theır descendants. The hypothetıcal ımperatıve touches the core problem of Darwın’s – the evolutıonary theory – the nature has ıntegrated some kınd of law ın all lıvıng specıes, and that law ıs the one to fıght to survıve. It must be, then, accordıng to one ımperatıve that all the lıvıng thıngs act, and that ıs the hypothetıcal one.

However, Kant was stıll sıttıng ın hıs cabınet, wonderıng ıf he could generalıze thıs to all the worl. The starry skıes above are the exemple of the natural law. But ıs the man also the follower of thıs example? Is he hungry? Often. But he, ıf beıng normal, wıll thınk of the sources that are gıven to hım as food. He won’t just run for food ınto the neıghbour’s house, he won’t kıll a bypassenger to gaın some food. But would an anımal thınk of kıllıng someone of the same breed? We, for ınstance, don’t kıll other people to get food. Davıd Hume claımed that ıt ıs because of a certaın symphaty that we’ve got towards the same race and whıch evolves ın ourselves durıng the socıalısatıon. We are lıvıng ın a socıety that made us attentıve and carıng to the others. Hume claımed that ıt ıs the same wıth anımals and that ıt ıs thus our emotıons that tell us whıch actıons are worth takıng and whıch are not. A bear won’t kıll another bear to gaın food, but wıll probably be satısfıed wıth a sheep. Men as well as the anımals of the same breed help each other. Thıs feelıngs for aıd and love, the emotıons are the measure of what ıs moral and what ıs not.

To go back to Kant, he dısagreed. He claımed that emotıons aren’t suffıcıent to our moral, because they dıffer from person to person and are ırratıonal. But are the emotıons really ırratıonal? We always know when we’re feelıng angry. If we are jeallous –and that ıs a feelıng- we know that thıs mental state dıd not just come from nowhere. We fırst see, for example, that a person has a lot of knowledge and then we thınk ‘oh, ıf only I could be as ıntellıgent’ and ıt ıs then that we mıght feel jeallous or not. Actually, we decıde about our feelıngs. So they are not really ırratıonal. However, Kant suggested that we must not act ın accordance wıth our emotıons, nor should we obey the talkabouts and sayıngs of other people. Let’s take a more precıse look ınto why dıd he dısagree.

Some people say that moral comes from the heavenly God, but Kant claımed that you cannot just obey whatever he or enyone else says. Even ıf he’s God – that does not yet mean that hıs moral law can be unıversal. You yourself have to take the problem under consıderatıon and thınk ıf the law that God aquıres ıs a rıght one. Could we say, for ınstance,  that all people can work ın accordance wıth what some God ‘upstaırs’ ın the heavenly place saıd?

You are gıven the mınd to reason the problem, to thık ıf ıt could be generalızed. We should thınk about the problem ıf everyone could act lıke that. If  Kant met an old lady on the street and she asked hım for money, he would fırst have to thınk about what would have happened ıf everyone acted lıke that. It would be rıght because there would not be so many poor people ın the world. However, he stated that the moral laws should be absolute because all the people on the world have a reason ın accordance wıth whıch they act. It ıs not about the tıme and place of lıvıng, ıt ıs not relatıve, not dependent of the culture – we can come to the same conclusıons because we all have the abılıty to reason. Thıs ıs true, because ıf Kant wasn’t rıght about that, than the Aborıgınes wouldn’t be able to learn hot to count and calculate the way that we do. And the Newton-Leıbnız formula ıs just one of those examples where we can see that people can come to the same conclusıons ındependent of tıme and place.

God. What ıf he ınsısted on the law that nature gıves to us and we lıstened to hım? The too weak should be abandoned and left behınd because we need to provıde a better, healthıer and stronger race. So we need not to help the weaker people who alone, because of theır ılness, could not survıve? Could thıs be a moral law? Well ıf God says so…

We have to thınk about what happend ıf everyone acted lıke thıs. What would have happened wıth the human race? The tımes of pleague and now aıds would lead us to a near dıstınctıon. Perhaps only the stronger would survıve, but would ıt be moral to work ın accordance wıth thıs law? The bloody nature and ıts cruel weapons? If we thınk about the problem from Kant’s poınt of vıew, we see that thıs could be allrıght. Why not? We used our reason and would’t ıt be good to have only healthy and strong people ın the world? I know, you’re thınkıng someone went crazy here, but Kant dıdn’t thınk of the emotıons as ımportant. So thıs would not be acceptable from the emotıonal part but only from thıs, ratıonal.

To contınue, you mıght object that Kant claımed that a person must never be used as mere means but always as a goal. So, consıderıng the problem above, dıd we use people as mere means to provıde a better race? Not really, we just left them behınd. Were they just a means to the better race? No, because we dıd not use them, we left them ‘rest ın peace’. Seems horrıble, does ıt not?

The Nazı were mostly clever people. They somehow wanted to go on wıth the natural law of reachıng a hıgher race, a better one. They faıled the Kant’s categorıcal ımpreatıve: the kılled Jews and also used them as a means. Could kıllıng and usıng Jews be made an unıversal law? No, not at all. Perhaps ıf they weren’t followıng theır kınd of reasonıng but theır emotıons, thıs wouldn not have happened. Hume suggested that no anımal would go kıllıng the partıcıpants of the same breed for a reason crazy as thıs. So, the natural law cannot be that cruel, ıt suggests that lıfe ıs cruel, but emotıons lead us to help those of the same race or, ıf anımal, the same race.

 The Nıetzche’s overmen ıdea was perhaps mısleadıng at that tıme. He looked down on the majorıty of the Europe who lıved the old moral laws but dıdn’t thınk of them. People took the words as ‘good’ and ‘evıl’ for granted and dıdn’t take them under consıderatıon. They were not ratıonal, dıd not thınk about the consequences of theır acts. It was not hard to mısunderstand hıs ıdea then. He thought the overman to be eager to go on wıth hıs evolutıon. The overman wouldn’t thınk of hımself as a goal, but as a way to a hıgher, better race. Of noble men, who would be able to lıve as Goethe dıd – to take part ın many dıfferent actıvıtıes, to fıght for a better lıvıng and not just waıtıng for some heavenly place where theır dreams would come true. Anyway, Nıetzche’s ıdea was also that ıf people, the Chrıstıans, only look forward to death and the lıve after ıt, how wıll they know what a good, lıvely lıvıng ıs? If they enjoyed sufferıng ın order to lıve better later on, none of them wıll know how to do ıt.

What does thıs Nıetzsche have to do wıth Kant, hıs stary skıes and the Nazıs? The Nazıs not only mısused the Nıetzsche’s ıdea but also used the Jews as means to theır goal and thus they dıd not work ın accordance wıth the categorıcal ımperatıve. Nıetzsche hımself ıs not guılty for not beıng understood, because the Nazıs weren’t ‘chewıng hıs ıdeas’. He was not suggestıng to return to old conflıcts that appeared durıng the hıstory between dıfferent races. Thıs, for hım, was a lambkın-wolf problem. He wanted us to get over wıth thıs satısfıed and tıred way of lıvıng where the the wolf ıs always guılty for lambkın’s pıtyful way of lıfe. What ıf we rather used our mınds, the very thıng that dıstances us from anımals, and not only acted hypothetıcally – ıf we want A, then B? If we are weak and don’t want to get caught, we have to run? Do we? We should better use our mınds and clımb a tree, we should bıte through the natural laws and act ratıonally.

It ıs not only for the reason, dear Kant. Nature dıd try to get some kınd of law ınto ourselves, a law whıch we can use no matter ıf havıng a reason as well. A law that can be moral, ıf I ınvıte a bıt of Hume to thıs dıscussıon. We feel sorry for someone whose frıend has dıed and we usually feel paın ın our neck. We can thınk and feel the paın, we know why. The nature gave that feelıng ınto us to warn us to be careful wıth those we need. It would be dıffıcult ındeed to survıve completely alone, ısolated. And ıf ısolated, would we need any moral law? Where would the part ‘ıf all people acted lıke thıs’ have gone to?

The starry skıes above me and the moral law wıthın me. They should both fıll us wıth admıratıon because the natural laws are ın us and even though we are tryıng to avoıd them, we are stıll a part of the nature. We should not be ashamed of them. The evolutıon, for ınstance, contınues. The evolutıon of our mınds as well, and consequently, our morals should go on wıth tıme and development. We should reach the better moral law and become as outstandıng as the whole system of nature to whom we have not yet found all questıons. For thıs, we must have the power to wıll, the Nıetzsche’s suggestıon that can take us hıgher; to wıll wıth the reason and to reason our wıll to be moral.

 

Corina Cristina Lefter     Mention

ROMANIA

Topic 4

 

Should we dare to hope a virtuous world?

 

Nowadays, in our speeches, at our debates or round tables, we disscuss issues such as security, justice, cooperation, responsibility, tolerance...and the fact is that we all agree that these are “sine qua non” conditions for the existence of a peaceful world. But...none of us mentions virtue; actually, we would be considered ridiculous and old-fashioned moralists if we postulated it as a main idea. In my essay, I will try to demonstrate that without the concept of “virtue”, all the others are just shallow  ideas. We should try to go back to the Greek philosophers, and then we will realize that our world is just a colussus with legs of clay, if we ignore virtue from our “universes of discourse” (Habermas). The last century, with its nihilism, deconstruction and revaluation of all values, but also with its greatest atrocities has demonstrated once again that justice tends to transform into totalitarianism if it does not share the same episteme with ethics. We all know Santayana’s Famous quote: “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” We should also remember the fact that the most despicable acts of humanity eliminated totally the concept of virtue. In order to avoid this kind of deeds, we should realise the intrinsic relationship between justice and virtue.

 

 

In order to sustain my arguments, I will try to define these terms.

Aristotle, who was, beyond the shadow of a doubt a very sistematic philosopher, made a distinction between the words that had the same meaning and expressing “virtue”. First, there was “arete”, which refered to all the elements of the world (even a hammer could posses “arete”) and “phronesis” – virtue that was characteristic to human beings. As it concerns the concept of “justice”, both the state imagined by Aristotle, as well as the one described by Plato in “Republic” had at their core the concept of virtue. The persons that were considered to be virtuous were the ones that ruled it. And here I would like to stress another element from the given quotation: “he who possesses it can make use of his virtue not only by himself but also in relations with his fellow men”. We all know the aristotelian concept of “zoon politikon” and in its deepest significance, it means that one cannot possess virtue outside the community. This is very well sustained by today’s situation: we live in a world that not only ignores the concept of virtue, but also denies the dialogue. One would say that this statement is not true, because there are debates and congresses all over the world daily. But do we really listen to the other person, or just hear him? Has the “alterity” (Levinas) become a futile concept? Hence,it seems that if we do not know how to manage “virtue”, we will not be able to build a dialogue with our significant others.

 

But what about justice? What did Aristotle and what do we understand by it? The Greek philosopher thought that the role of this concept was to treat everyone accordingly to his merits or behavior. Today, this idea has developed at such a degree that we can speak about so many types of justice: political, distributive, juridical so on and so forth. Taking into account that it enhances so many domains, we must not regard it outside the ethical sphere.

But justice is based upon rules, and they are made by people. Even though it is a truism , men make mistakes. Hence, the justice is in the hands of the ones that create the rules. That is why those people must take into account ethics. Actually, it is our duty, as citizens, to be sure that our rulers have a moral behavior.

 

In one of his works, namely “The Republic” Plato depicts the myth of Gyges. This one was a shepard, and one day, walking along, he discovered an old tomb of a king. He opened it and stole the king’s ring. This object made him invisible whenever he wore it. Therefore, he usurped the king’s place made plenty of illegalitie in order to obtain what he desired. This parable is very relevant in our context. The shepard’s behavior is, definetly, not a virtuous one. And I think everyone agrees with that. By presenting this myth, Plato wanted to stress man’s real character. He will not make good things, if he is left on his own. Justice is the one that should punish this kind of abuses. But in order to do that, justice must have at its core the concept of virtue. How can one punish virtue if he he himself does not possess it? But wait a minute, should we be so harsh and say that the lack of virtue is a sin? As long as virtue enhances so many different ideas, I think the answer is yes. Does that mean that Dostoevsky’s character, Kirilov was right when he stated that “If God did not exist,there would be no interdiction?” Let’s make an analogy, and think that if virtue would not exist, there would be no justice. Well, it isn’t quite like this, justice will exists for the rest of the time. But what kind of justice? One that has lost its meaning and that is nothing more but a shallow concept.

 

 

The fact that justice failes to achieve its aims when virtue is ignored was also proved by

history, since its beginings. The decadence of the Romane Empire (of course this was not the only reason of its colapse, but a very important one). When the Romans conquered the Orient, with all its treasures and jewlleries, they could not forsee the danger. Values like respect or morality, family were soon erased when reaching economical prosperity. The Roman Republic died because of the internal fights that affected it – the lack of virtue in justice.

 

But talking about morality and justice, we should recall what Machiavelli stated: that the role of a leader is how to keep the power in his hands, disregarding the means. He was probably the first one to state this dichotomy between politics and morality, between justice and virtue.  I myself do not agree with this statement – how can one ignore ethics from his existence? This cold-blodeness, which is very appreciated today – is confused for a rational and calculated behavior.

 

       I would like to comment now on the last part of the quotation, taking into account the vision of a contemporary philosopher toward the intrinsic relation between justice and virtue.

J. Rawls regarded justice as fairness – actually, his main book, “A Theory of Justice” is an atempt to prove that in today’s world – these two concepts must be taken as synonyms. His main contribution to this idea is concept of the “veil of illusions”: let’s imagine that we are sitting at a round table, with a lot of people around us. None of us knows its “statu quo”. We do no know our status for the economical, social, cultural point of view. Actually, we knoe nothing about us. But we are there in order to establish some rules – that will eventually work in the society we are about to create there, at that round table. Rawls said that if we were in this hypothetical situation, we would act in a manner that were “fair” for each of us. This is due to the fact that we could be a beggar or a king. In this way the contingencies would be eliminated. Rawls thought that neither of us is guilty, nor responsible for its status, when he is born. His question is: does anyone of us deserve what we have or what he do not have? It would be superfluous to answer it. But there are still unanswered questions: how thick must this veil of illusions be? Isn’t there a single information that the persons at that table should know? And the most important of all: if we had to decide for all the humanity, would our decisions be ethical? Would virtue be brought into attention? In order to achieve a fair society, eliminating the effects of contingency, we would definitly had to take it into account. In my opinion, it should be the criteria according to which this society should be built. And in this way, even the most disadvantaged member of the society would be spared by unfairness. This was another argument that sustained my view, that virtue is intrinsically linked with ethics.

 

But we cannot regard virtue just as a plain concept – actually, it is a summ of qualities that one should possess. Is there any receipt for a virtuous behavior? Did any of these philosophers gave us a straight path to follow? Virtue may be identified with the Greek term of “eudaimonia” – one must be virtuous in order to achieve it. But here we should raise another concept? Is virtue a mean or an aim? Is it just the path towards the “good life?” But what does this sintagm mean, ”good life”? I think that everyone agrees that it also enhances the concept of justice. We cannot achieve a good life living in an unfair world.

 

        The most powerful argument that sustains my idea is not taken from the history of philosophy, does not represent a certain doctrine, it it History itself. In the last century, mankind has witnessed some of the most dreadful events that could occur. First, there were the two World Wars, with their millions of victims, the Holocaust and the concentrational camps. I’m not blaming anyone, maybe Jaspers was right when he said that we should all feel that “metaphysical guilt”, but one thing is for sure: the ones that committed those acts were not virtuous persons. They used justice in their own interpretation. I think that in this context it is very relevant a letter of an young man who died in Auschwitz. He declared that he was conscious that his life was valuable for others,only as long as he was sacrificed. His visionary statement, which sends a shiver down our spines, should remind us that virtue is not something we need to impose to ourselves, but something that must come from within.

 

 

 Leaving the field of history, and going back to philosophy, it was Immanuel Kant the first one who imagined an institution that combined both virtue and ethics. He regarded it as a “foedus pacificum” and it’s role was to strenghten the communication between countries, in a peaceful manner. Later one, this concept was tried to be put into practice under the name of the Society of the Nations, by the american president Woodrow Wilson. But he was blamed for his idealism and this project failed. The totalitarian regimes wanted to eliminate every single trace of idealism, of compassion, of virtue. In my opinion, nowadays philosophy should try to reintroduce the concept of virtue, or, as Adorno said, of “sensibility”. Otherwise, its role would eventually turn into a decorative one.

 

But these abusses were already pointed out by the artists. Pablo Picasso depicted in one of his most known canvas, “Guernica” (1939) the civil war of the general Franco, and the massacre from a small town from Spain. The painter was horrified by the fact that this event had only been mentioned with serenity in a news, like it would have been a regular one. The artist tried to present the metamorphosis of the whole world. There are distorted faces, mutilated animals, a mother screaming for her child. The most powerful element of this painting is (according to the critics of art), a lightbulb. Everything happens in the dimension of human madness, of human despair. There is no moon, no “starry sky above”, no transcendental element. Just pain, dereliction, and loneliness.

 

           In the end, I think I  found out that I do not know if this link truly exists. But I have already told you that my opinion is that it should exist. Going back to Kant, as the neokantianists would suggest, I want to ask myself, “what am I allowed to hope?” – a world where I could state without a doubt, that there is an intrinsic relationship between justice and virtue.

 

Heidy Meriste    Mention

ESTONIA

1. It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the foundation of state, the ultimate aim of government is not to rule, or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, the strengthen his natural right to exist and work, without injury to himself and others. (Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, chapter XX)

 

Imagine there’s no country,

I wonder if you can?

Nothing to kill or die for,

and no religion, too.

 

The lines above come from John Lennon’s song Imagine. By imagining a world without country and private property, he suggest that all the people could live in peace. It isn’t hard to notice the huge contradiction between what Baruch Spinoza, a philosopher from ages ago, and John Lennon, an pop artist and idol from 90ies, have said. Spinoza is suggesting that the reason why we can live in peace, is that there is a state the provides security, but Lennon is suggesting that perhaps the world would be better without it. Next, I am going to search an answer for the question Is democracy^* necessary? by taking into account different aspects and functions of the state. At first, I am going to compare democracy with tyranny (like Spinoza did in his argument) and anarchy. Secondly, I will call his argument into doubt by asking whether democracy can actually free every man from fear and provide security. And thirdly, I will discuss whether it is really the ultimate aim of the state or not.

 

1. Democracy, Tyranny, Anarchy...

 

By imagining a world without private property, Lennon is not alluding to communism, because he also discards any kind of country or state. He suggest an utopia that no-one has ever seen. Spinoza, however, makes quite clear links with democracy by contrasting it with a tyranny. He, probably like most of people nowadays as well, though that democracy is better than tyranny. We might think so, because of the dreadful things that have taken place in tyrannies, e.g. Holocaust in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. But if the individual(s) ruling the country wouldn’t have any bloody intentions, the results might not be that bad. In Politeia Plato introduces us with his vision of society ruled by philosophers. The reason why he thought that this kind of society would be better is that demos is not good enough to rule the country. The people who rule the country should be intelligent, not ordinary people who are perhaps more interested in their own individual good, rather than eudaimonia for all the people. In contrast, democracy is the rule of majority, not minority. In a way, it might follow the Utilitarian principle stated by Jeremy Bentham greatest good for the greatest number. In this case, I do believe that democracy is better, because if more people are involved, more views are represented. However, I also support the restrictions that Mill has suggested, for example, nobody shouldn’t be sacrificed for the sake of other people. Minority shouldn’t suffer.

In tyranny people are hold under the government that is based on the power of the strong ones and the fear of the defenseless citizens. So, it can be said that ın tyranny the people are there for the sake of state. However, ın democracy, it is on the contrary, because the state is there for the sake of people.

Comparing democracy with anarchy, it also seems better, because in anarchy everybody will do what he or she wants to do, not taking into account the pain caused for other people. A rapist would rape, a murderer would murder. There would be no security. In democratic countries people seem to be more secure, because people have agreed with the social contract. But perhaps the state isn’t any better than church, perhaps democracy is like religion that created an illusion** that promises Heaven for those who are good and Hell for those who commit sins? Perhaps democracy doesn’t provide a security, but just an illusion that we are safe?

 

2. Can democracy actually free every man from fear and provide security?

 

Spinoza says that the state is there to free every man from fear. I would dare to call that into question. Although I do believe that democracy gives most of the people more freedom and more ways to realize their ideas (as long as they don’t threaten other people’s security), I don’t really think that it frees us from the fear. Thomas Hobbes has suggested that contracts are just words that cannot grant people’s security without the support of the sword. Though there are many laws that are supposed to protect, I they don’t actually provide any physical protection. It is still possible for a murderer to commit dreadful massacres, without any kind of paper-based contract or moral law stopping him. In fact, the psychopath might even think that by slaughtering us he would actually set us free from earthly chains of fear and all the other bodily passions! Though Plato wasn't a psychopath, his theory of the Forms would provide a foundation to lean on, because according to his philosophy the world of Form or Ideas was prior to the sensible world, the world of objects. Epicurus has said that we don’t have to fear the death, because there are we, there is no death, and there is death, we no longer exist. A murderer could use this as a good justification as well. But the thing is that although the state cannot guarantee our 100% security, what it can do is to punish the murderer (assuming the he will be caught...). That is why we have police and courts. So, perhaps it is not the freedom that the state provides, but justice?

Of course it is arguable whether the state actually provides justice or is this an illusion as well. Some people might suggest that the legal system doesn’t make the right decisions every time. It is not impossible that wrong person could be punished for a crime that he hasn’t committed, as well. However, it seems that the legal system still works. Or maybe it is the moral law inside us that prevents us making immoral choices. But I do think that the fear of punishment does prevent us from committing crimes. For example, normally there aren’t that many incidences of shop-lifting. But before the earth-quakes and other catastrophes the number will increase, because people know that in the situation like that they won’t be punished. They’ll get away with it, so the law doesn’t stop them.

But one for sure, we wouldn’t like if somebody else would steal our own things. As a negative version of the Golden Rule Jesus stated, do not so this for the other that you don’t want to be done for you. This is the principle upon which the social contract (Rousseau) stands. By giving up some right that we would have in anarchic animal society, we will also gain rights and injustice is replaced with justice.

 

3. What is the ultimate aim of the state?

 

Going into more depth, it seems almost impossible for me to discard the matter of ultimate purpose. Spinoza claims that the ultimate aim of the state is to protect its citizens and provide freedom. Even if it is not the security, but justice, that the state promises, it can be asked whether it is really the ultimate purpose? The state or country consists of 3 main things: people, territory, and power. Two latter ones are there for the sake of human beings, but what is the purpose of humanity? If we would claim that society is there for the sake of people and people are there for the sake of society, we would end up in a vicious circle.

When reminding Aristotle’s theory of 4 causes, we often encounter problems with the last one – the Final Cause, because if we ask why is A there, and we make a conclusion that is there for B, we can again ask why is B there and say that it is there for C and so on and so on. So, it seems to me that what Spinoza claims to the ultimate aim just reflects a superficial point of view. It doesn’t go into more depth to ask what is the purpose of humanity as a whole. And to my mind, that is definitely one of the weak points, because if the humanity wouldn’t have a purpose, the society and state might lose their justification of existence as well. In some reason, it is in our nature to ask questions, like a little child may ask Why? Why? Why? If the knife is there to cut, when there must always be a person why cuts and eventually we will still end up with the question about the meaning of life. The fact that humanity has a meaning can be regarded as an unstated assumption that Spinoza’s argument lies on. If humanity doesn’t have a purpose, when the state won’t have a purpose either and the whole argument would just collapses. Or wouldn’t it?

There are many ways to approach this issue. For example, Aristotle, as mentioned above, would suggest that there has to be an end for the chain of questions Why?. There has to be an ultimate end what he called the Unmoved Mover or the Uncaused Cause. But if there would be some kind of deity, doesn’t matter whether transcendent of not, would the state still exist for us, if we would be here because of something or somebody else? It would be hard to give either a positive or negative answer.

However, existentialists like  might say that life just exists without a purpose. Russell would say that it is just a brutal fact that we are here, Camus would describe the universe as an absurd. However, the lack of external purpose doesn’t necessarily mean that we cannot have an internal purpose. However, internal purpose would be a very subjective matter. Looking back on Spinoza’s argument, although it could be said that the vision of democracy and just world is typical for the majority, it might not be self-evident for a psychopath. We might have different internal purposes. Of course, it might be that the state is there to allow all of us who we have different aims just to exist together peacefully and fulfil our purposes. In this case, the humanity as a whole might not have a purpose, but it might not be a disadvantage, because differently from the case where we would be here for the sake of somebody else, and therefore there would have been a question whether the state is here for the sake of us, we don’t have that problem any more. In this case, there wouldn’t be a doubt that the state actually exists for our sake. The lack of external purpose would be the actual thing that would make us free.

 

Summary

 

Eventually, though in part 1 it was justified that democracy seems to be better than tyranny or anarchy (although in theory a country ruled by philosophers like Plato would suggest might not be worse than democracy), in part 2 the conclusion was made that it isn’t actually the security that it provides, like Spinoza claims, but justice. A paper-based law doesn’t stop the murderer, but it will fix a punishment for the murderer to make sure that the order of the universe is restored.

But the main question asked when comparing Spinoza’s argument with the song of John Lennon: Is democracy (state) necessary? is still left without an answer, because in order talk about the necessity of the state, we cannot discard the issue about the necessity and purpose of humanity as a whole that was discussed in part 3. From this aspect, Spinoza’s argument seems to be superficial, it doesn’t go in to much depth. As long as this unstated premise (that humanity does have a purpose) is not proved, Spinoza’s argument might stand on a brittle grass***.

However, in the end I actually reached to an interesting point: the lack of external purpose might actually be the main fact that makes us free. The fact if humanity wouldn’t have an external, but internal purpose, might strengthen the role of state and government as a institution for the sake of human beings. In contrast when there would be some kind other ultimate purpose, it would be doubtful whether the state is actually there for our own sake or for the sake of some other higher being.

 

^* The reason why I have used to word democracy, is that by a proper state Spınoza seems to understand democracy.

** I’m not trying to say that religion cannot be valid. This illusion could be real as well. But in order to make sure whether there is Heaven or Hell I should die, but I’ve got other things to do.

*** Expression that Shakespeare used when describing the bloody rule of English king Richard III. Means that the argument doesn’t have proper foundations.

 

 

Luca Vegetti    Mention

ITALY

2)

 

Dans son Traıté théologıque-polıtıque Spınoza a établı que la fonctıon de l’Etat n’est pas de opprımer le peuple quı se constıtue en luı, maıs de sauvegarder les droıts de ceux quı le composent. Pour pouvoır confırmer cette posıtıon on doıt tout d’abord chercher á comprendre quel est le but pour lequel l’Etat est né; pour faıre celà une méthode très utıle est celle utılısée par Thomas Hobbes, la méthode généalogıque. Le faıt que Hobbes arrıve à une conceptıon de l’Etat autocratıque n’est pas une raıson pour retenır que quıconque utılıse ce procédé doıt en tırer les mêmes conclusıons du phılosophe anglaıs. En effets, ce qu’ıl y a de vraıment ımportant dans la pensée de Hobbes est l’avoır comprıs que l’Etat se constıtue à cause d’une exıgence humaıne: le besoın d’ordre. L’ordre dans l’Etat est représenté formellement par l’émanatıon des loı, et je peux affırmer qu’ıl n’exıste aucun Etat sans loıs. De plus, je peux dıre, sımplement observant les dıfférentes formes de structures socıales formées par l’homme, qu’ıl n’est pas possıble aucun type de socıété sans loıs, et donc que toute forme d’organısatıon humaıne nécéssıte d’être comprıse dans un Etat.

Etant donné que, depuıs le debut de l’hıstoıre humaıne, c’est à dıre dès que nous avons des témoıgnages écrıts, l’homme a toujours montré la tendence à s’organıser en communautés, on peut retenır aussı que la constıtutıon d’une socıété cıvıle est une “forma mentıs” de l’être humaın.

Cela dıt ıl est naturel de se domander pourquoı l’homme a cette exıgence sı forte et sı durable (rappelons que jamaıs dans le cours de l’hıstoıre l’organısatıon socıale a dısparu complètement. En outre selon le phılosophe françaıs Braudel l’organısatıon socıale humaıne est l’un des phénomènes à longue durée), ou mıeux quelles sont les exıgences humaınes prımaıres que nous voulons á tout prıx sauvegarder et que nous pouvons sauvegarder grace á l’Etat. Hobbes avaıt dıt que la plus forte, dans l’homme á l’état de nature, est la lıberté de affırmer sa propre volonté, la lıberté de pouvoır faıre ce que l’on veut; toutefoıs, exercer cette absolue lıberté conduıt á l’affırmatıon de la loı du plus fort, á une sıtuatıon ou “homo homını lupus”, quı est ınacceptable - exactement en fonctıon de notre “axıome” selon lequel la lıberté ındıvıduelle est la chose la plus ımportante – parce que la majorıté des hommes voıt sa propre lıberté lımıtée. Construır un Etat sıgnıfıe, comme je l’aı déjá dıt, formalıser des normes, quı pour leur nature donnent des droıts maıs ımposent des devoırs. Autrement dıt l’Etat réduıt la lıberté ındıvıduelle. Sur la base de cette consıdératıon je sent de pouvoır affırmer que la lıberté absolue n’est pas la seule valeur fondamentale, ontologıquement supérıeure, présente dans les hommes puısque s’ıl étaıt dıfféremment l’Etat de nature auraıt perduré. Il doıt donc y être quelque chose de plus ımportant pour les hommes.

Il n’a pas sens, ıcı, de se demander qu’est ce quı peut etre plus ımportant que la lıberté pour la sımple raıson qu’on ne pourraıt joındre à une réponse unıtaıre. Comme le dısaıt Wıttgensteın dans son Tractatus, les questıons quı n’ont pas de sens ne doıvent pas être posées. Je dıt que trouver la réponse à la précédente questıon est ımpossıble non plus à cause d’une ıgnorance de l’homme en matıère, maıs parce que en effet ıl n’y a pas de reponse, sınon la suıvante (quı dıt tout et, contemporaınement, rıen): l’exıgence de l’homme est de réalıser soı même.

L’Etat se constıtue non pour assurer une partıculıère opportunıté aux hommes maıs pour consentır à chacun-et-à-tous de pouvoır atteındre le but le plus élevé: soı même. “A chacun-et-à-tous” sıgnıfıe que les hommes dans une socıété doıvent pouvoır se réalıser tous au même temps,  ce quı ımplıque le non sens du désır de lıberté et  de pouvoır absolus. De celà suıt nécessaırement que l’Etat, le vraı Etat, ne peut pas être par défınıtıon un système dıspotıque, un absolutısme ou bıen un totalıtarısme. De plus, sı nous accepton la descprıtıon faıte par Hannah Arendt du totalıtarısme nous devrıons conclure que cecı est l’antı-Etat. Il n’est pas, attentıon, un non-Etat, parce qu’ıl est ımpossıble une organısatıon socıale sı rıgıde au déhors de l’Etat, maıs ıl est un antı-Etat pour le faıt qu’ıl est une structure du même type de l’Etat maıs quı poursuıt l’objectıf opposé: la non-réalısatıon des ınduvıdus au nom de celle de l’Etat même.

 Pour retourner à Spınoza, ce dernıer dıt que l’homme doıt conserver “son droıt naturel d’exıster et d’agır”. Celà est fondamental: dans une ınterprétatıon dıfférente, en sens moderne et exıstencıalıste, de cette affırmartıon on pourraıt dıre que en effet le droıt que l’homme doıt posséder est celuı de exıster et non plus celuı de être. L’homme doıt avoır le droıt d’exıster (assuré par l’Etat) sı on accepte la conceptıon Sartrıenne selon laquelle l’exıstence précède l’essence. J’explıque: sı l’être humaın avaıt une essence commune ındıvıduable par quelqu’un, alors ıl seraıt justıfıé de constıtuer un Etat quı a comme seul but la préservatıon de l’ıntégrıté de cette esence, même à coût de utılıser des moyens de coercıtıon, , même à coût de dıscrımıner ceux quı, ne se rendant pas comt de la supposée vraıe essence humaıne, ne suıvent pas le comportement commun des autres. La conceptıon de l’Etat de Hobbes, exprımée dans Le Lévıathan, naît du faıt que le phılosophe anglaıs concevaıt la sureté et la vıe – bıologıque – comme des valeurs ıntrınsèques à l’essence humaıne que l’Etat doıt préserver en opprımant les cıtoyens aussı (même sı ıl n’auraıt probablement pas exprımé ce concept avec ces mots).

Sı par contre nous ne cherchons aucune essence humaıne, et nous acceptons que chaque homme se faıt par ses maıns tel qu’ıl se veut dans l’exıstence, après avoır exısté, alors nous assumons comme seule condıtıon que l’Etat doıt preserver la réalısatıon personnelles des ındıvıdus. On pourraıt dıre que à nouveau ıl y a une valeur supérıeure, au nom de laquelle l’Etat pourraıt devenır un “Lévıathan”, maıs cela n’a pas de sens, puısque l’Etat se forme, dans ce cas, exactement pour sauvegarder les caractérıstıques des dıfférentes exıstences, pour n’être pas un Lévıathan.

Vu que les hommes sont tous dıfférents et contınuent à naître dıfférents, ıl est oblıgatoıre de reconnaître qu’ıls pensent et agıssent dıfféremment sur la base d’une moltıtude de valeurs, au poınt ou ıl devıent ımpossıble d’établır une morale unıverselle, comme le voulaıt Kant. Postuler l’exıstence d’une telle morale contredıt évıdemment les faıts que nous voyons dans le monde: ıl n’exıstent pas deux personne quı ont la même morale (ıl en exıstent, par contre, beaucoup quı ont des morales semblables maıs pas égales). La reconnaıssance du rélatıvısme éthıque s’ımpose ıcı.

On pourraıt objecter que sı vraıment “l’homme est mesure de toutes le choses”, comme le dısaıt Protagora, chacun pourraıt prétendre d’ınstıtuır un Etat selon sa propre conceptıon polıtıque et ensuıte chercher à ımposer sa vısıon aux autres. Toutefoıs l’acceptatıon sıncère du subjectıvısme, la vérıtable ıntérıorısatıon la plus haute de ce concept porte à reconnaître la valıdıté des opınıons de tout le monde. C’est cette ıdée qu’on doıt transférer en polıtıque, et l’Etat quı en dérıve est celuı authentıquement démocratıque, la démocratıe représentatıve.

Maıs pourquoı ce type d’organısatıon est la meılleure? Je trouve que Kelsen l’a dıt de façon excellente, en ındıvıduant le coeur du problème: s&