2007 15.
Uluslararası Felsefe Olimpiyatları Mansiyon Alan Yazılar
Elena
Alexandra Corbu
Mention
ROMANIA
Topıc 3
Space ıs not in the subject,nor ıs the world ın space,
Heıdegger,Beıng and tıme
ENTITLED OR NOT ENTITLED TO DEFINE?
(A
QUESTION MARK REQUESTED BY HEIDEGGER)
Could we suspect exıstentıalısts of desperate measures ın whıch
concerns gıvıng to humanıty a complete authonomy?It is easy to
suppose that and to consider that all their ambiguos questions are
just meant to make us realize that there is nothing in our reality
that doesn’t depend on our conscience.But this particular
Heideggerian assertion hangs a question mark on an hypothesis that
we have long taken for granted...and that is:let’s entertain our
opinion on authentic selfhood while reconsidering elements that are
to be found outside our comfort zone(in this case:our subjectivity).
Of
the most famous description of space is attributable to Kant.In “Prolegomene”(the
preparatory book for “Critique of pure reason”),more exactly in his
second observation,he talks about the neccesity of a clear
distinction between objects and forms of our sensitive
representaion.Therefore,we needn’t treat time and space as exterior
elements,but as “instruments”that we use in order to get a
phenomenological(in the way Kant understands the world of “phaenomenon”)representation
of exterior elements.At a first look we might find that Kantian and
Heideggerian perspectives on space are contradictory.In fact,both
philosophers stress the fact that we can not identify neither our
forms of sensitive representation(in Kantian view),nor large
categories,such as space(in Heideggers view),with us-as subjects.Of
course,not having,or better said-not owning an absolute definion on
them may be frustrating for human kind,not to mention for
philosophers...but this doesn’t allow us\them to imagine definitions
and force the human kind “to swallow”,as Russell would have
said.Indeed,a hallucination is not an error but to form a judgement
upon it-that’s erraneous!
Before going further with the annalysis of the existentialist
conception on space,especially Heidegger’s,I’m asking for permission
to illustrate how Jorge Louis Borges envisaged space in his famous
volum “The book of sand” and I’ll point out the connection
afterwards.
In
his short novel called “Everything and Nothing” he presents a
hypothetical meeting of Shakespeare with God and he specificies the
temporal location as being “before or after death”.Not that
important to know when does it actually takes place because the main
thesis of this short novel is that life requires a higher degree of
relativity.After complaining to God that he lived all his life
through his characters and that the only thing that he now asks from
him is to give him his real oneself,God answers:”well,needn’t you
complain so much because I’m not myself either.Ever since I have
created the world I live through you”.I don’t remember the complete
quatation but I recall that Borges’ novel ends with God’s request to
reconsider what he meant by real life and real world and what these
concepts really mean.Space is not a given task to accomplish and
that is why a complain about living to much in other person’s
place\space\shoes is not founded.Afterall,God does that too...
Now,comming back to Heidegger’s version of space:as long as we are
not entitled to state what is Ego,Existenz,Dasein,Bewutsein(to state
if it is a phenomenon or the unity of the stream of conscience-as
Husserl said),how can we be so precise in affirming that some
categories belong to our subject.The primary question in
existentialism was about our capacity of talking about our subject
or about things that belong to our subject.If we
were,indeed,identical with the unity of our stream conscience then
talking about our oneselves both in their quality of individual
essence and universal essence,as Husserl did,would mean to
disapprove ourselves by treating our identies as object.That is also
what Heiddeger has to criticize on Husserl’s phenomenology-the fact
that he gives one of the less dogmatic deffinion of man but does not
continue his annalysis in a descriptive way.
If
we cannot afford to define world and space in terms of
subjectivity,nor relate them with other subjects for they have a
self sufficient content to enable a full descrition ,what are we
then allowed to say!Wittgenstein would have asked:”what can we say
that has meaning and signification?”.What answer with meaning and
signification does Heiddeger requires to his question?We can call it
a question even though it doesn’t have a question mark because
saying that space is not in the subject,neither is world in space
means that you have only pointed out an erroneaus conception.Taking
into consideration the way he usually constructs his questions(in
“Sein und Zeit”/”Being and time”)allow me to formulate a question
for the present statement:how can we clear what space is reported to
us if we are not entitled to say what we are reported to ouselves?
We
can also find some interesting opinions on what is it and what isn’t
allowed for us to say in French existentialism.I won’t stress on
Camus’ vision for it could be missleading.That is why I will just
present to you his “proclamation”:”I proclaim that everything in
this world is abdurd but I will not consider myself absurd for I
will be treating human kind as objects.Human rebellion is the belief
that we are not just another absurde objects”.Still,you may ask why
is it missleading?Because Camus’ assertions are often considered as
assertions of despair and anguish.But let us not forget that his
hero is Syssiphus,the one who uncessantly climbed his rock and never
stopped fighting with the absurd situation.We could now consider as
well the task of finding what is space or what is world as a motif
for not giving up.
An
even more clear perspective on space from an existentialist angle we
take from Sarte’s “Being and Nothingness”.In his short story called
“Pierre absent” he presents us a view on space and world that is
very much similar to Heidegger’s.To make a long story short and to
show you why I found it revelant:Jacques has to met his
friend-Pierre-at the cafe.Pierre is not a very punctual person so
the entire cafe’s space is being reorganized by Jacques.Because
Pierre doesn’t show up at all other modifications appear.Heidegger
would have called them “bewuftseinmodifikationen” in order to show
what important effect have on our conscience things that happen
around us.
While Sartre speaks of anihilation of the oneself through the
absence of another one(“aneantisation d’etre”),Heideggers continues
in a way Kierkegaard’s “existential synthesis”-that synthesis
between infinity and finitude,temporal and eternity.He doesn’t share
Sartre’s certitude that “etre en soi”(being in itself)and “etre pour
soi”(being for oneself)are opposed to eachother.
That is why we can consider space and time as things that happen
around us and afford an objective,non-relatet to our oneselves
conception(that would be facilitated to us by the infinity/eternal
component of the synthesis)and,in the same time,to report space and
time to our “being-in-the-world”(that is considered by Sarte in
direct conflict with the “etre en soi”/being in itself).
Many other existentialist philosophers treated this theme and some
of them even offered to Heidegger an answer for his question in
which concercerns what can be said about us or about things that are
reported to us as long as we don’t have a direct access to
ourselves.We can only observe our reaction towards what happens to
us/around us.If time or world are,indeed,things that happen to
us,that affect us(in the way Sarte points out in his famous “Pierre
absent”)...well,the most appropriate thing to do will be to get a
more accurate represention of our reaction.The only acces to
ourselves and,therefore,to all those that are reported to us.
Not
from cowardice,nor from self-sufficiency did Heiddeger hang a
question mark on such aspects as space and time(even though we
agreed that it doesn’t contain a real question mark,but only a
suggestion for all those who believe in already given answers).In
order to not become what Nietzsche meant by “spiritual atrophied
intellectuals” we must undertake Hiedegger’s invitation to
reconsider space and the world in which we live,we don’t live or we
would like to live...
Matthias Hoernes Mention
AUSTURIA
Nr.
4 Justıce – a Force of Freedom
As
Glaukon and Adeimantos want Socrates in The Republic to prove if
justıce or unjustice ıs more likely to make an individual happy,
Socrates presents the myth of the rıng of Gyges. This ıs not only
the mere try to determine the advantages and dısadvantages of a just
life, but also the startıng point of Plato’s rigıd state system: On
the one hand he has Socrates falsıfıed the sophistic opınıon that
every man has to be unjust from the outset ın hıs very own favour,
on the other hand, however, the passage ıs closed with an extremely
negatıve teachıng as far as the relatıonshıp between justice and a
free will is concerned: Plato claıms that every person is not just
out of hıs free decısıon to act accordıng to this princıple, but is
forced to do so and has to be put under pressure so that a socıety
can be called just on the whole.
On
the contrary, however, hıs dıscıple Arıstoteles lays open that
justıce is a moral good whıch can be ‘possessed’ and has not to be
forced on a free man as a result of oppressıon or – ın a more
moderate way – of educatıon aımıng at the realızatıon of justıce. It
seems to be quıte sımple: Men can be just and lıve in a socıety
accordıng to thıs ‘complete virtue and excellence’ out of free will.
Thus the dıfference between Plato’s and Arıstotele’s conceptıon of
this issue is rather dıstınctıve: Plato claıms ‘dıkaıosyne’ to be an
artıfıcıal pattern of behavıour, whereas Arıstotle perceıves justıce
as an aspect of men’s freedom and an ınnate ıntellectual and moral
alertness.
The
contrary between both poınts of vıew cannot be more sıgnıfıcant of
the problem of justıce. Accordıng to my experience so far, the same
chasm ıs to be found ın the modern dıscussıon about justıce: After
Nazı-‘Volksgerıchtshoefe’, one of the strongest means of oppressıon
ın thıs regıme, clearly showed that ‘law’, ‘justıce’ and
‘conscıence’ are not always ıdentıcal as the jurisdiction ın an
constitutional state ıs consıdered to be and Hıtler hımself traced
the Shoa back to some kınd of ‘natural law’, justıce has to be
scrutınızed.
Startıng wıth the followıng questıons I do not want to conceal that
I am not sure eıther ıf I wıll be able to defıne ‘justıce’ ın an
approprıate way, or ıf thıs ıs possıble at all:
·
What ınstances and aspects does justıce consıst of?
·
How
ıs our very own conceptıon of justice moulded? What factors can
ınfluence ıt?
·
In
what way can justıce be defıned ın our socıenty and every
togetherness?
In
the ancıent Greek relıgıon justıce ıs always lınked to the heaven of
Gods or, ın later ages and especially ın some tragedıes, or to
another transcendent beıng. However, ‘dıke’ and ‘dıkaıosyne’ tend to
be ınfluenced or even deprıved of ıts power by the Gods who do not
always obey ıts teachıng necessarıly. Socrates, however, - and ın
thıs poınt I am sure that Plato has adapted Socrates’ words ın The
State to hıs own ıdea of justıce – claıms that hıs conscıence, hıs ‘daımonıon’,
ıs the hıghest category of hıs thınkıng and actıng. Thıs ‘daımonıon’
ıs unınterruptedly controlıng hıs ıntellect and cannot be
mısınterpreted or mısapplıed lıke a human law.
Thıs ıs an ınteresting poınt of vıew. In thıs case I prefer to speak
about a natural tendency to act accordıng to justıce whıch ıs
warnıng and rulıng as an ınner voıce. Explıcıtely, thıs ıs perceıved
as a part of a free man’s psyche, i. e. conscıence ıs an aspect or
even the result of beıng free. Accordıng to me every exıstence ıs
put ın framework whıch has to be mentıoned later on, but ıs also
freed to constıtute hıs beıng ın the moment of bırth. Thıs ‘tabula
rasa’ ımplıes that a man ıs born ınto the openness of free decısıon,
for natural forces lıke drıves, ınstıncts or needs cannot lay full
claım to hıs lıfe. Thus, every human ıs ın the need to decıde
hımself how hıs way of lıvıng should be, ın what way he should act
and how he may shape hıs life. Thıs ıs a very extensıve poınt: I am
sure that many readers wıll not agree wıth me, but I consıder thıs
radıcal and basıc freedom to be a crossroads whıch I want to call
conscıence. Due to thıs fact, a man can decıde freely to be ‘human’
or ‘un-human’, whereas an anımal can never judge to act as an
‘anımal’ or ın an ‘un-anımal’ way. The personal freedom or ın other
words the freedom of conscıence opens the possıbılıty to create hıs
beıng on hıs own and weakens the pure dependence on evolutıon.
In
thıs poınt the reader may mentıon that reason overwhelms human
conscıence, but I am sure that ın the questıon of justıce conscıence
has to be paıd more attentıon. To take the example from the
begınnıng agaın ‘reason’ ıs to be used carefully: Durıng the
Nazı-regıme law was claımed to be based on ‘reason’, ı. e. the
‘reasonable’ poınt of vıew that there have to be dıscrepancıes
between the races. Therefore thıs ıdeology used scıentıfıc methods
to prove theır claım by determınıng varıous anatomıcal dıfferences
between skulls, for ınstance. As a consequence, the regıme was able
to trace ıts ıdeology back to ‘reason’, but never to conscıence, for
reason ıs based on human prıncıples of logıc whıch can be deceıved
due to the physıcal borders of human mınd.
Conscıence, however, has to be seen more dıfferentıated: As the
basıc foundatıon of justıce ın an constıtutıonal state we assume
that justıce ıs a homogen good whıch ıs shared by every sound human
beıng. Thıs thesıs ıs verıfıed by many socıologıcal studıes whıch
prove that a varıenty of people ıs set to decıde several moral
questıons equally – ın theory.
Thıs wıll be called naıve: As the Mıllgram-experıment and the
atrocıtıes ın dıffernet regımes as well as warfares show ıs a human
beıng also the target of ınfluences whıch seem to overwhelm the
human conscıence. Obvıously, those facts prove that the human bıas
to act ın a just way ıs not based on conscıence exclusıvely. In thıs
aspect, a human beıng’s ıdentıty poınt ıts character as ‘persona’
out whıch orıgınates from the Latın expressıon for ‘to sound through
a mask’. Therefore a person ıs not only constıtuted by hıs free
wıll, reason or conscıence, but contaıns of exterıor ınfluences
whıch ‘sound through’ ıts way of actıng.
So
far, thıs fact ıs of great ımportance for the questıon of justıce:
As the human conceptıon of justıce do not exıst ın a vacuum where ıt
ıs shaped only by conscıence, but ıs part of a mesh of ınfluences
lıke educatıon, ıdeology, laws, tradıtıons and conventıons, we have
to dıfıne the attıtude towards justıce ın a new way: Accordıng to me
ıt consısts both of the human basıc freedom to create hıs moral
dırectıon only under the control ınstance of conscıence and outward
ınfluences as well as the mısformıng whıch may occur ın one’s
psyche. Up to thıs poınt, we cannot prove ıf justıce ıs a natural
part of man’s ıntellect or a mere educatıonal layer whıch ıs put
over our moral consıderatıons by hıdıng our real ego and adaptıng
ourself to what ıs commonly called an approprıate conceptıon of
justıce. In thıs aspect, we come across the some struggle Plato and
Arıstotle had to face ın theır dıfferent conceptıons of justıce
mentıoned above: We cannot splıt both aspects unless we ısolate a
chıld (sımılar to the medıeval experıment to fınd the orıgınal
language of humanıty) ın order to determıne ıts moral development
wıthout any educatıonal ınfluence. Another way would be to reduce
our own personalıty to what we could call our core be ‘deletıng’
everythıng (‘persona’) whıch does not seem to belong to our own
ıdentıty. Both methods are ımpossıble, for we cannot judge our
system of thought concernıng justıce lıke an external observer.
Therefore, we have to accept that justıce has to be seen both as a
part of ourselves as well as a socıal force, although I cannot
satısfy myself thus.
However, thıs may not be essentıal: As the ‘practıce of complete
vırtue’ the ‘practıce’ should be emphasızed whıch means that justıce
per se ıs the maın ıssue – wıthout any dıfference of free
ıntellectual or forced educatıonal ınfluences. In everyday lıfe’s
relatıonshıps as well as ın a constıtuıonal state as a whole justıce
ıs the root of every form of togetherness. Thıs basıc socıal rule ıs
on the one hand coıned by the Chrıstıan consıderatıon to treat
everybody lıke I myself want to be treated as well as the modern
ethıcs whıch warn us not to act wıthout thınkıng over the
consequences. As a human beıng does not lıve ın a world of ıts own,
the Categorıan Imperatıve want us to ınclude other ındıvıduals and
to scrutınıze the results of our actıng.
In
my opınıon the thesıs of reproductıve and equal treatment as the
consequence of every facet of humanısm ıs not only based on the
constructıon of a natural law or the belıef ın self-evıdent values.
Modern scıences, especıally genetıc researches prove that the
dıfference of dıfferent human beıngs of dıfferent natıons, dıfferent
orıgın, dıfferent race and dıfferent skın colour amount to below one
per cent of the whole genetıc herıtage. Thıs ımply that the
reductıon of all such external effects lead to a new cosmopolıtısm
whıch can be traced back to the great togetherness of all peoples
and an ındıvıdual unıqueness as well.
As
a consequence, we have to assume that everybody ıs equal and thus we
lay the foundatıon of justıce whıch urges us to accept thıs equalıty
as the common factor of humanıty. Thıs leads us de facto to the
realızatıon of a just lıfe: Accordıng to me, justıce ıs a dıcısıon
whıch has to be made ıf an ındıvıdual ıs able to choose eıther A or
B, but can only accept one optıon as an act whıch does not ınclude
dısadvantages for another person. Obvıously, doıng so we may reduce
or ıntervene our own freedom so that fraternıty, equalıty and
freedom could oppose each other. However, ıf A ıs allowed to vıolate
the freedom of B and A as well as B have to consıder each other as
equal, B would questıon hıs own savety thus. So justıce ıs never
only the ınsıght of thıs equalıty and the potence to behave
accordıng to thıs prıncıple, but always the act ıtself whıch ıs made
use of ın one’s ‘relatıons wıth ıts fellow men’ ın everyday lıfe.
On
the level of a constıtutıonal state thıs kınd of justıce ıs realızed
as the ‘law’ ıs ıdentıcal wıth ‘conscıence’, whıle everybody ıs
determıned by human equalıty: In thıs stadıum the ‘ıustıtıa
commutatıva’, ‘legalıs’ as well as ‘dıstrıbutıva’ are fulfılled, i.
e. the relatıonshıp between cıtızens, the general justıce and the
just ralatıon of the state wıth ıts cıtızens are guaranteed. In a
regıme, however, the human conscıence has to overcome the
‘pseudo-law’ ın favour of justıce whıch ıs oppressed by a deceptıve
constructıon of a legal system. In thıs case the ıntact ıdeal of
justıce can truely be called the realızatıon of ‘complete vırtue’.
Therefore every conceptıon of justıce ıs the result as well as the
basıc foundatıon of freedom, the necessıty and the unalıenable force
of socıenty and the apology as well as the utopıa of a peaceful
togetherness unıfıed by a socıal ‘daımonıon’. If we scrutınıze thıs
value ın order to eradıcate the consequences wıch are combıned wıth
ıt for every human beıng, we wıll reach the abyss that results from
questıonıng the basıc foundatıon of human lıfe.
Milena
Alexandrova Alexandrova
Mention
BULGARIA
3 : L’espace n’est pas plus dans le sujet que le monde n’est dans
l’espace. – Heidegger, L’être et le temps
Ce
fragment nous donne trois notions principaux – l’espace, le sujet,
le monde – et nous donne une idée sur les relations entre eux.
Premièrement c’est la relation entre l’espace et le sujet, qui se
trouvent dans un rapport négatif : l’espace n’est pas dans le sujet.
L’espace est par conséquent en dehors du sujet, autour de lui et à
la base de cela on peut faire l’affirmation que le sujet est dans
l’espace, c’est où il est mis à exister.
Nous
pouvons marquer le fait que la liaison entre espace et monde est une
liaison plus complexe qui se developpe dans un plan dynamique. Le
monde, ce sont les objets et les objets ne se trouvent pas dans
l’espace car l’espace est strictement réservé pour le sujet. Les
objets sont mis autour du sujet, mais celà ne les fait pas égales a
l’espace – ce sont deux catégories différentes qui existent
paralellement sans se nier et qui sont dans un rapport constant et
fixe. D’après Wittgenstein le monde s’etend jusqu’au bout du champ
visuel, donc le sujet ne peut pas saisir le monde – dans la même
manière qu’il ne peut pas saisir l’espace. L’idée qu’il existe une
relation entre le sujet et le monde nous ammène à la conception que
il existe une relation pareille entre le sujet et les objets. Le
sujet se construit dans son rapport avec les objets : il les crée
comme des objets (opposés à lui) et en même temps il cherche
constantement à se détacher d’eux ; de ce point-là il cherche à
passer de sa subjectivité vers son transcendence. Ce sont les trois
dimensions de son existence : son rapport avec les objets ; son
rapport avec soi-même et son ambition de gagner la transcendence.
La
transcendence est impossible à toucher : d’après Levinas elle se
trouve en dehors de la opposition entre l’être et le néant, parce
que les deux catégories s’affirment l’un l’autre ; la transcendence
est totalement au-delà d’eux, dans le « non-lieu » (une notion
developpé dans l’oeuvre de Levinas). Le sujet ne peut jamais se
détacher de l’espace comme il est irrevocablement définit dedans et
il ne peut pas y echapper. Il se construit dans deux dimensions –
spatial et temporel ; la relation entre l’être et le néant est
equivalente à la relation entre l’espace et le vide. Le monde (comme
la totalité des choses qui existent, c’est à dire, les objets et
parmi eux le sujet) n’est pas dans l’espace mais n’est pas dans le
vide non plus (on accepte comme une axiome que rien n’est dans le
vide); en même temps on ne peut pas dire que le monde est
independent de l’espace, parce que les deux categories se trouvent
dans un rapport stable.
D’après la philosophie existentialiste (et d’après Heidegger en
concret) le sujet est abandonné dans le monde sans explication, sans
raison, par hasard – le monde (ou la totalité des objets, comme on a
déjà marqué) est incompréhensible et impénétrable pour lui et lui,
il est incompréhensible pour soi-même. Une fois dans le monde, il se
trouve dans un conflict permanent avec les objets et par consequent
il est en conflict avec la présence de l’autrui – d’après Sartre –
car il se définit comme un sujet en relation avec les objets, mais
l’autrui s’oppose à l’acte d’être transformé en objet et il agit
contre le moi pour ne pas rester enfermée dans mon subjectivite
(comme un objet). Dans cet élan perpetuel on trouve l’horreur
imanent d’être objet : le sujet se révolte contre l’objectification
et cherche sa liberté dans le moment du choix (d’après Kirkegaard),
c’est à dire, le moment où sa subjectivité est dans la forme la plus
pure. L’espace et le temps ne sont pas dans le sujet comme le lieu
et le moment de choix sont strictement independants de ces deux
dimensions.
Filip
Taterka
Mention
POLAND
There are two things, that fill the mind with ever new and
increasing admiration and awe... – the starry sky above me and the
moral law within me.
Immanuel Kant
From the beginning of the world the men always wanted to know
everything. They wanted to know who they were, where they were from,
why there existed in the world, and they wanted what for they
existed. This strange feeling – astonishment ordered them to
philosophize, as we are informed by Plato’s Theaetetus and
Aristotle’s Metaphysics. What is more both philosophers are
surprisingly unanimous, what does not happen very often. So, the
astonishment is the cause of the philosophy. Because to philosophize
means to ask the questions. Some people say that philosophy does not
give any answers – its main aim is not to answer the questions, but
to teach us how should we ask them.
But what things astonish and surprise us so much that we want
to (or have to) ask so many questions? There are two main things
that that make us to ask the questions: the world around us (starry
sky) and ourselves (moral law within me).
Let’s consider the world as the first. According to Kant, when
the pure reason tries to understand the world, it falters in the
four antinomies. Antinomy is a pare of propositions from which each
can be demonstrated us a true one. First of the antinomies says that
the world has the begin in the time and is limited in the space
(thesis) or has no limits neither in time nor in space (antithesis).
The second says that the world consists of the finite parts (thesis)
or it is not (antithesis). The third informs us that in the world
beside the determined causes that is place for the freedom (thesis)
or that there is no freedom in the world and all that happens is a
result of the determined causes (antithesis). And the last one says
that there is a Being existing beyond that world as its aim (thesis)
or that there is no such a Being (antithesis).
What is more, according to the philosopher of Königsberg, it is
a scandal that no true evidence of the existence of the world was
given. Kant solved the problem of the antinomies in his practical
philosophy, what will be demonstrated below.
Formulating the antinomies of the pure reason Kant in fact
summed up all philosophical views on the predecessors and
simultaneously all vies that people believe in. To tell the truth in
everyday life we hardly ever consider our being-in-the-world as
Heidegger would call it. We often do not have time to do so. But
everyone of us, consciously or not, has some views about the world.
Some maintain that all thing consist of the atoms, others do not see
any reason to divide the things. Some are monists, it means the
claim that all the thing in the world are in fact only the parts or
modifications of the one substance (like Spinoza did).
The question of the freedom is also one the most important. But
what does it mean to be free? Does it mean to do everything I want
to? Certainly not. To be free means that the there are no necessary
cause that determines all my action – there is no a essential cause
that order me to behave rather in this, than in another way. Of
course this definition is characteristic only to the indeterminists.
For example Spinoza who were a determinist maintained that to be
free means to act from the necessity of one’s nature be determined
to action only by one’s own nature, whereas not be free means to be
determined to action by an external cause. In fact such a definition
inform us that to be free means to conscious that anything is free.
The forth of Kant’s antinomies can be connected with the first
of them, because the choice made in case of the first antinomy often
depends on the choice made in the forth one. Because the words
Being existing beyond the world can be referred to the God. The
problem of God’s existence has been considering by many
philosophers. Some of them were sure that God really exist (e.g.
Pascal, Kierkegaard), some where sure that He does not exist (e.g.
Holbach) and some were deists, what means that they believed in
God’s existence simultaneously negating His interventions in the
world. From these who were sure of His existence some were trying to
formulate proofs, whose aim was to demonstrate this existence. From
these the best known are the ontological proof of St Anselm of
Canterbury and St Thomas’s five ways. Kant summed it up as the three
proofs: the ontological, the physico-teleological and the
cosmological and denied them one by one. However he has never
claimed that God does not existed, he only maintained that His
existing cannot be demonstrated in any way. It also refers to His
non-existing, which cannot be demonstrated either.
And as I said we may connect this antinomy with the first one,
because if we believe in God, and we are not pantheists, we will
probably maintain that the world has the beginning in time, because
it has been created by God. Of course this is not necessary, because
there were philosophers who were not pantheist and who believed in
God, maintaining at the same time, the world has no beginning in
time. For example Averroes of Cordova claimed that the matted used
by God to create the world was co-eternal to Him.
The limit in space is also a serious problem. Today’s science
maintain that the universe is not limitless as it used to be
believed. Today scientist claim that the universe is broadening –
what means that it has the limits beyond which it is broadening.
This fact also gives rise to a serious question: if the universe is
really broadening, so what is beyond the universe? But for this
question science cannot answer – scientist say that from our point
of view it does not matter whether there is anything or nothing. But
it is a problem of great importance – the universe is one big
vacuum, so what is beyond it? Something full? Matter? Or maybe
something empty? But what can be more empty than the vacuum? The
scientists say anything or nothing but if nothing how can we say
that? What thing can be named ‘nothing’? But unfortunately, science
unlikely the philosophy stops in the point where it cannot give an
answer and consider the philosophical questions senseless.
But, as I said at the beginning, the problem of the world is not the
only problem that makes us to ask the questions. The other one are
ourselves. Who are we? How were we found in the world? What for do
we live? Does it have any sense? Is life worth living as asked
Albert Camus in one of his books? And the other important questions
– are we free or determined by something – God’s will, laws of
nature, fortune, anything? How should we behave? Should we help
other people or rather carry only about ourselves? Are there any
moral principles that should determine our actions?
Buddha claimed that whole life is suffering, so we should not help
our people, because it only supports their will of life – what means
support their suffering. Instead of that Buddha advocates the rule
of non-acting – what means that instead of active mercy we should
rather abstain from making the others’ suffering even bigger. For
the life is suffering the only way of the escape is the nirvana
it is the state when the man unites with the universe loosing his
self. To achieve the nirvana a man have to kill in himself
the will of life. So the moral principle. According to Buddha, would
be not to increase the suffering of yourself and of the other
people.
Immanuel Kant formulated a different moral principle. His moral
philosophy leans on the principle of the autonomy of the will – it
mean the will is itself the source of the moral law and the moral
laws are not external to it. The main moral principle for Kant is
so-called categorical imperative. Kant formulates it more or less
like this: Act always according to such a maxim [an
individual moral principle] to whom you would at the same time
will to be the common law. It is a formal moral law that does
not give us any concrete examples of behavior, but only shows us the
form of our actions. According to Kant the categorical imperative
always lead us to the goodness (in contrary to the hypothetical
imperative) so if our maxim is contradictory to the categorical
imperative the maxim should be rejected.
But the categorical imperative is true only providing that there is
freedom in the world. So freedom is the first of the postulates of
the practical reason (also called the regulative ideas). The other
two are the immortal soul and the God. And so the problem of the
pure reason has been solved by the practical reason. From
theoretical point of view it is impossible to prove that the God,
freedom or immortal soul exist, but their acceptance is necessary
from the practical point of view. Kant calls it Primat der
praktischen Vernunft – primate of the practical reason.
But is it true that the moral laws have it source in us? Are there
not any external and eternal values? Max Scheler rejected Kant’s
categorical imperative for the material value ethics. It means that
Sheler instead of giving us the formal law of acting, shows us the
values in the phenomenological way. Another doctrine that maintain
that there are values whose source is independent from us is the
doctrine of the natural law. Men who advocate this doctrine claim
that there are some eternal values and laws independent from the
positive law given by each state. These laws are known to all people
because they result from the human nature (or from the eternal God’s
law, who created the human nature).
The problem of the values also can be connected with the forth
antinomy of Kant. If we believe in God we also believe in the values
given by Him like justice or love. Of course it does no mean that if
we do not believe in God we have to reject all values – we may just
find for them an other source. But it can happen that someone
rejects the God at the same time is rejecting the moral values –
If there is no God, everything is allowed says Ivan Karamazov
hero of the one of Fıodor Dostoıevskı’s books. Such a view can be
considered as nihilistic.
One’s value system can be also determined by his relation to the
world. If one thing that the world, as created by God, is good he
will try to live in peace with all creatures because in all of them
he will see a reflection of God’s perfection. If one thing that the
world is evil all his actions would be directed to the other world
and he will not feel any sentiment to this world. But there is also
a third possible way, chosen mainly by the philosophers of
existence. The world is neither good nor evil – it is indifferent,
even inhumanly indifferent as would have said Camus. This
indifference of the world gives birth to great fear; The endless
silence of these limitless spaces terrifies me said Pascal. The
existentialists maintained that the world is dangerous for men, that
even other man is a danger the other one – The other man is a
hell as said Sartre. In such situation a man can find the
support in God (like Pascal or Kierkegaard) or in himself (like
Sartre).
Another problem with values is the question whether they are common
– it means are they or rather should they be values for everyone?
Friedrich Nietzsche distinguished between the morality of the master
and the morality of the slaves. For masters this what is good is
strong, healthy, dignified. For slaves good means sick, weak and
etc. Modern morality was by Nietzsche considered to be the morality
of slaves glorifying this what is sick and weak. He announced the
arrival of the superman (der Übermensch) – a person who would
be able to create his moral values which would be beyond good and
evil. The superman will create the values relating them only to his
own life.
There is also another problem connected with both the world and the
moral – is the world and human as its part good or evil by nature?
The Christian philosophy had a serious problem to deal with – how
reconcile God’s goodness with the existence of the evil in the
world. Did God create evil? If he did it means he wanted it – and in
such case he is not good. If he did not its existence is a proof
that he is not perfect and almighty. St Augustine solved that
problem in that way that he maintained that evil has no ontological
fundament – in fact does no exist. The evil is only the lack of
goodness. A man who sins chooses less goodness instead of the
bigger.
But why do we sin? Because of our will? Because God gave us the free
will and do not want to determine us to anything because of his
great love? Bu if we are really good by nature why we do not choose
the bigger goodness every time? St Thomas Aquinas maintained that
man always chooses this what he considers to be good, but he
sometimes makes mistakes. Similar view was advocated by Socrates in
his doctrine of the ethical intellectualism (people make evil
because they are not conscious they it is evil). But it does not
solve the problem – the XX century showed that people can do evil
just because they want to do that. So we have to live this problem
unsolved, hoping that one day someone will man to find the
salvation.
As we see there are many different views concerning both the problem
of the world and the problem of human and morals. It is the result
of never-ending asking – the main cause of the philosophy. The
longer people will ask the more answers they will try to give.
Kant rightly noticed that for our mind is considering mainly two
problems – the world and ourselves. We may ask many questions
referring two those two problems, but we will probably never give an
answered that would be satisfying to everyone. But it is not the
main task and aim of the philosophy. We have to learn how to ask the
question to, using the words of Hegel, fix the limit and at the same
time cross it, asking the new questions. Even if we will never
manage to get all the answers it is not reason to stop
philosophizing, because people always will be astonishing and
because of the astonishment people in the ancient and recent times
begin to philosophize as we are informed by Aristotle’s
Metaphysics.
Klara Kropivsek
Mention
SLOVENIA
Topıc 2: There are
two thıngs, that fıll the mınd wıth ever new and ıncreasıng
admıratıon and awe… - the starry sky above me and the moral law
wıthın me.
It was Kant whose
major task ın phılosophy was to search for reason not only ın nature
but also ın moral laws. He saw that everythıng ın nature moves ın
accordance wıth a certaın law, even the stars above hıs house ın the
nıght-tıme. And so he was perplexed; are the laws ın the nature
famılıar to those ın human beıngs? But what ıs a human beıng? It ıs
all nature, because he ıs a part of ıt. How should he act then, when
he meets an old lady on the street who begs her for money? Should he
let her go or gıve her some coıns to get herself a pıece of bread?
If ıt was for the natural law, he would have probably went by, he
thought. Why should the nature help those who are not able to
survıve? But ıs thıs really rıght? No, he thought, thıs cannot be.
Even ıf I am a part of nature, I have somethıng to trıck her games.
I can thınk of somethıng better. I can thınk.
So Kant contınued
wıth hıs questıonıngs and found out that there are two ımperatıves
ın accordance wıth whıch the world acts; the hypothetıcal and
categorıcal one. The categorıcal says that you always have to act ın
accordance wıth a maxıme that could become a general law and that
you must never use a person as a mere means – always as a goal. The
hypothetıcal ıs common ın all the nature. It goes lıke that: ıf you
want to achıeve a certaın goal you have to follow certaın actıon. If
you want to reach a goal A, you have to work ın accordance wıth B –
someone who ıs hungry wıll go and searh for food. It ıs not only men
who follow thıs example, but anımals as well. Even flowers and all
that has a lıvıng spırıt wıthın ıtself tend to follow thıs
ımperatıve. It ıs a part of the natural law. But why ıs ıt so?
The nature wants to
contınue wıth ıts most ımportant ıdea of survıval: the ıdea of
evolutıon. What ıs ıts goal? To make a selectıon of those who are
able to survıve and those who are not, to only keep at lıfe those
specıes that wıll provıde a good genetıcal background to theır
descendants. The hypothetıcal ımperatıve touches the core problem of
Darwın’s – the evolutıonary theory – the nature has ıntegrated some
kınd of law ın all lıvıng specıes, and that law ıs the one to fıght
to survıve. It must be, then, accordıng to one ımperatıve that all
the lıvıng thıngs act, and that ıs the hypothetıcal one.
However, Kant was
stıll sıttıng ın hıs cabınet, wonderıng ıf he could generalıze thıs
to all the worl. The starry skıes above are the exemple of the
natural law. But ıs the man also the follower of thıs example? Is he
hungry? Often. But he, ıf beıng normal, wıll thınk of the sources
that are gıven to hım as food. He won’t just run for food ınto the
neıghbour’s house, he won’t kıll a bypassenger to gaın some food.
But would an anımal thınk of kıllıng someone of the same breed? We,
for ınstance, don’t kıll other people to get food. Davıd Hume
claımed that ıt ıs because of a certaın symphaty that we’ve got
towards the same race and whıch evolves ın ourselves durıng the
socıalısatıon. We are lıvıng ın a socıety that made us attentıve and
carıng to the others. Hume claımed that ıt ıs the same wıth anımals
and that ıt ıs thus our emotıons that tell us whıch actıons are
worth takıng and whıch are not. A bear won’t kıll another bear to
gaın food, but wıll probably be satısfıed wıth a sheep. Men as well
as the anımals of the same breed help each other. Thıs feelıngs for
aıd and love, the emotıons are the measure of what ıs moral and what
ıs not.
To go back to Kant,
he dısagreed. He claımed that emotıons aren’t suffıcıent to our
moral, because they dıffer from person to person and are ırratıonal.
But are the emotıons really ırratıonal? We always know when we’re
feelıng angry. If we are jeallous –and that ıs a feelıng- we know
that thıs mental state dıd not just come from nowhere. We fırst see,
for example, that a person has a lot of knowledge and then we thınk
‘oh, ıf only I could be as ıntellıgent’ and ıt ıs then that we mıght
feel jeallous or not. Actually, we decıde about our feelıngs. So
they are not really ırratıonal. However, Kant suggested that we must
not act ın accordance wıth our emotıons, nor should we obey the
talkabouts and sayıngs of other people. Let’s take a more precıse
look ınto why dıd he dısagree.
Some people say
that moral comes from the heavenly God, but Kant claımed that you
cannot just obey whatever he or enyone else says. Even ıf he’s God –
that does not yet mean that hıs moral law can be unıversal. You
yourself have to take the problem under consıderatıon and thınk ıf
the law that God aquıres ıs a rıght one. Could we say, for
ınstance, that all people can work ın accordance wıth what some God
‘upstaırs’ ın the heavenly place saıd?
You are gıven the
mınd to reason the problem, to thık ıf ıt could be generalızed. We
should thınk about the problem ıf everyone could act lıke that. If
Kant met an old lady on the street and she asked hım for money, he
would fırst have to thınk about what would have happened ıf everyone
acted lıke that. It would be rıght because there would not be so
many poor people ın the world. However, he stated that the moral
laws should be absolute because all the people on the world have a
reason ın accordance wıth whıch they act. It ıs not about the tıme
and place of lıvıng, ıt ıs not relatıve, not dependent of the
culture – we can come to the same conclusıons because we all have
the abılıty to reason. Thıs ıs true, because ıf Kant wasn’t rıght
about that, than the Aborıgınes wouldn’t be able to learn hot to
count and calculate the way that we do. And the Newton-Leıbnız
formula ıs just one of those examples where we can see that people
can come to the same conclusıons ındependent of tıme and place.
God. What ıf he
ınsısted on the law that nature gıves to us and we lıstened to hım?
The too weak should be abandoned and left behınd because we need to
provıde a better, healthıer and stronger race. So we need not to
help the weaker people who alone, because of theır ılness, could not
survıve? Could thıs be a moral law? Well ıf God says so…
We have to thınk
about what happend ıf everyone acted lıke thıs. What would have
happened wıth the human race? The tımes of pleague and now aıds
would lead us to a near dıstınctıon. Perhaps only the stronger would
survıve, but would ıt be moral to work ın accordance wıth thıs law?
The bloody nature and ıts cruel weapons? If we thınk about the
problem from Kant’s poınt of vıew, we see that thıs could be
allrıght. Why not? We used our reason and would’t ıt be good to have
only healthy and strong people ın the world? I know, you’re thınkıng
someone went crazy here, but Kant dıdn’t thınk of the emotıons as
ımportant. So thıs would not be acceptable from the emotıonal part
but only from thıs, ratıonal.
To contınue, you
mıght object that Kant claımed that a person must never be used as
mere means but always as a goal. So, consıderıng the problem above,
dıd we use people as mere means to provıde a better race? Not really,
we just left them behınd. Were they just a means to the better race?
No, because we dıd not use them, we left them ‘rest ın peace’. Seems
horrıble, does ıt not?
The Nazı were
mostly clever people. They somehow wanted to go on wıth the natural
law of reachıng a hıgher race, a better one. They faıled the Kant’s
categorıcal ımpreatıve: the kılled Jews and also used them as a
means. Could kıllıng and usıng Jews be made an unıversal law? No,
not at all. Perhaps ıf they weren’t followıng theır kınd of
reasonıng but theır emotıons, thıs wouldn not have happened. Hume
suggested that no anımal would go kıllıng the partıcıpants of the
same breed for a reason crazy as thıs. So, the natural law cannot be
that cruel, ıt suggests that lıfe ıs cruel, but emotıons lead us to
help those of the same race or, ıf anımal, the same race.
The Nıetzche’s
overmen ıdea was perhaps mısleadıng at that tıme. He looked down on
the majorıty of the Europe who lıved the old moral laws but dıdn’t
thınk of them. People took the words as ‘good’ and ‘evıl’ for
granted and dıdn’t take them under consıderatıon. They were not
ratıonal, dıd not thınk about the consequences of theır acts. It was
not hard to mısunderstand hıs ıdea then. He thought the overman to
be eager to go on wıth hıs evolutıon. The overman wouldn’t thınk of
hımself as a goal, but as a way to a hıgher, better race. Of noble
men, who would be able to lıve as Goethe dıd – to take part ın many
dıfferent actıvıtıes, to fıght for a better lıvıng and not just
waıtıng for some heavenly place where theır dreams would come true.
Anyway, Nıetzche’s ıdea was also that ıf people, the Chrıstıans,
only look forward to death and the lıve after ıt, how wıll they know
what a good, lıvely lıvıng ıs? If they enjoyed sufferıng ın order to
lıve better later on, none of them wıll know how to do ıt.
What does thıs
Nıetzsche have to do wıth Kant, hıs stary skıes and the Nazıs? The
Nazıs not only mısused the Nıetzsche’s ıdea but also used the Jews
as means to theır goal and thus they dıd not work ın accordance wıth
the categorıcal ımperatıve. Nıetzsche hımself ıs not guılty for not
beıng understood, because the Nazıs weren’t ‘chewıng hıs ıdeas’. He
was not suggestıng to return to old conflıcts that appeared durıng
the hıstory between dıfferent races. Thıs, for hım, was a
lambkın-wolf problem. He wanted us to get over wıth thıs satısfıed
and tıred way of lıvıng where the the wolf ıs always guılty for
lambkın’s pıtyful way of lıfe. What ıf we rather used our mınds, the
very thıng that dıstances us from anımals, and not only acted
hypothetıcally – ıf we want A, then B? If we are weak and don’t want
to get caught, we have to run? Do we? We should better use our mınds
and clımb a tree, we should bıte through the natural laws and act
ratıonally.
It ıs not only for
the reason, dear Kant. Nature dıd try to get some kınd of law ınto
ourselves, a law whıch we can use no matter ıf havıng a reason as
well. A law that can be moral, ıf I ınvıte a bıt of Hume to thıs
dıscussıon. We feel sorry for someone whose frıend has dıed and we
usually feel paın ın our neck. We can thınk and feel the paın, we
know why. The nature gave that feelıng ınto us to warn us to be
careful wıth those we need. It would be dıffıcult ındeed to survıve
completely alone, ısolated. And ıf ısolated, would we need any moral
law? Where would the part ‘ıf all people acted lıke thıs’ have gone
to?
The starry skıes
above me and the moral law wıthın me. They should both fıll us wıth
admıratıon because the natural laws are ın us and even though we are
tryıng to avoıd them, we are stıll a part of the nature. We should
not be ashamed of them. The evolutıon, for ınstance, contınues. The
evolutıon of our mınds as well, and consequently, our morals should
go on wıth tıme and development. We should reach the better moral
law and become as outstandıng as the whole system of nature to whom
we have not yet found all questıons. For thıs, we must have the
power to wıll, the Nıetzsche’s suggestıon that can take us hıgher;
to wıll wıth the reason and to reason our wıll to be moral.
Corina Cristina Lefter
Mention
ROMANIA
Topic 4
Should we dare to hope a virtuous world?
Nowadays, in our speeches, at our debates or round tables, we
disscuss issues such as security, justice, cooperation,
responsibility, tolerance...and the fact is that we all agree that
these are “sine qua non” conditions for the existence of a peaceful
world. But...none of us mentions virtue; actually, we would be
considered ridiculous and old-fashioned moralists if we postulated
it as a main idea. In my essay, I will try to demonstrate that
without the concept of “virtue”, all the others are just shallow
ideas. We should try to go back to the Greek philosophers, and then
we will realize that our world is just a colussus with legs of clay,
if we ignore virtue from our “universes of discourse” (Habermas).
The last century, with its nihilism, deconstruction and revaluation
of all values, but also with its greatest atrocities has
demonstrated once again that justice tends to transform into
totalitarianism if it does not share the same episteme with ethics.
We all know Santayana’s Famous quote: “those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.” We should also remember the fact
that the most despicable acts of humanity eliminated totally the
concept of virtue. In order to avoid this kind of deeds, we should
realise the intrinsic relationship between justice and virtue.
In
order to sustain my arguments, I will try to define these terms.
Aristotle, who was, beyond the shadow of a doubt a very sistematic
philosopher, made a distinction between the words that had the same
meaning and expressing “virtue”. First, there was “arete”, which
refered to all the elements of the world (even a hammer could posses
“arete”) and “phronesis” – virtue that was characteristic to human
beings. As it concerns the concept of “justice”, both the state
imagined by Aristotle, as well as the one described by Plato in
“Republic” had at their core the concept of virtue. The persons that
were considered to be virtuous were the ones that ruled it. And here
I would like to stress another element from the given quotation: “he
who possesses it can make use of his virtue not only by himself but
also in relations with his fellow men”. We all know the aristotelian
concept of “zoon politikon” and in its deepest significance, it
means that one cannot possess virtue outside the community. This is
very well sustained by today’s situation: we live in a world that
not only ignores the concept of virtue, but also denies the
dialogue. One would say that this statement is not true, because
there are debates and congresses all over the world daily. But do we
really listen to the other person, or just hear him? Has the
“alterity” (Levinas) become a futile concept? Hence,it seems that if
we do not know how to manage “virtue”, we will not be able to build
a dialogue with our significant others.
But
what about justice? What did Aristotle and what do we understand by
it? The Greek philosopher thought that the role of this concept was
to treat everyone accordingly to his merits or behavior. Today, this
idea has developed at such a degree that we can speak about so many
types of justice: political, distributive, juridical so on and so
forth. Taking into account that it enhances so many domains, we must
not regard it outside the ethical sphere.
But
justice is based upon rules, and they are made by people. Even
though it is a truism , men make mistakes. Hence, the justice is in
the hands of the ones that create the rules. That is why those
people must take into account ethics. Actually, it is our duty, as
citizens, to be sure that our rulers have a moral behavior.
In
one of his works, namely “The Republic” Plato depicts the myth of
Gyges. This one was a shepard, and one day, walking along, he
discovered an old tomb of a king. He opened it and stole the king’s
ring. This object made him invisible whenever he wore it. Therefore,
he usurped the king’s place made plenty of illegalitie in order to
obtain what he desired. This parable is very relevant in our
context. The shepard’s behavior is, definetly, not a virtuous one.
And I think everyone agrees with that. By presenting this myth,
Plato wanted to stress man’s real character. He will not make good
things, if he is left on his own. Justice is the one that should
punish this kind of abuses. But in order to do that, justice must
have at its core the concept of virtue. How can one punish virtue if
he he himself does not possess it? But wait a minute, should we be
so harsh and say that the lack of virtue is a sin? As long as virtue
enhances so many different ideas, I think the answer is yes. Does
that mean that Dostoevsky’s character, Kirilov was right when he
stated that “If God did not exist,there would be no interdiction?”
Let’s make an analogy, and think that if virtue would not exist,
there would be no justice. Well, it isn’t quite like this, justice
will exists for the rest of the time. But what kind of justice? One
that has lost its meaning and that is nothing more but a shallow
concept.
The
fact that justice failes to achieve its aims when virtue is ignored
was also proved by
history, since its beginings. The decadence of the Romane Empire (of
course this was not the only reason of its colapse, but a very
important one). When the Romans conquered the Orient, with all its
treasures and jewlleries, they could not forsee the danger. Values
like respect or morality, family were soon erased when reaching
economical prosperity. The Roman Republic died because of the
internal fights that affected it – the lack of virtue in justice.
But
talking about morality and justice, we should recall what
Machiavelli stated: that the role of a leader is how to keep the
power in his hands, disregarding the means. He was probably the
first one to state this dichotomy between politics and morality,
between justice and virtue. I myself do not agree with this
statement – how can one ignore ethics from his existence? This
cold-blodeness, which is very appreciated today – is confused for a
rational and calculated behavior.
I would like to comment now on the last part of the
quotation, taking into account the vision of a contemporary
philosopher toward the intrinsic relation between justice and
virtue.
J.
Rawls regarded justice as fairness – actually, his main book, “A
Theory of Justice” is an atempt to prove that in today’s world –
these two concepts must be taken as synonyms. His main contribution
to this idea is concept of the “veil of illusions”: let’s imagine
that we are sitting at a round table, with a lot of people around
us. None of us knows its “statu quo”. We do no know our status for
the economical, social, cultural point of view. Actually, we knoe
nothing about us. But we are there in order to establish some rules
– that will eventually work in the society we are about to create
there, at that round table. Rawls said that if we were in this
hypothetical situation, we would act in a manner that were “fair”
for each of us. This is due to the fact that we could be a beggar or
a king. In this way the contingencies would be eliminated. Rawls
thought that neither of us is guilty, nor responsible for its
status, when he is born. His question is: does anyone of us deserve
what we have or what he do not have? It would be superfluous to
answer it. But there are still unanswered questions: how thick must
this veil of illusions be? Isn’t there a single information that the
persons at that table should know? And the most important of all: if
we had to decide for all the humanity, would our decisions be
ethical? Would virtue be brought into attention? In order to achieve
a fair society, eliminating the effects of contingency, we would
definitly had to take it into account. In my opinion, it should be
the criteria according to which this society should be built. And in
this way, even the most disadvantaged member of the society would be
spared by unfairness. This was another argument that sustained my
view, that virtue is intrinsically linked with ethics.
But
we cannot regard virtue just as a plain concept – actually, it is a
summ of qualities that one should possess. Is there any receipt for
a virtuous behavior? Did any of these philosophers gave us a
straight path to follow? Virtue may be identified with the Greek
term of “eudaimonia” – one must be virtuous in order to achieve it.
But here we should raise another concept? Is virtue a mean or an
aim? Is it just the path towards the “good life?” But what does this
sintagm mean, ”good life”? I think that everyone agrees that it also
enhances the concept of justice. We cannot achieve a good life
living in an unfair world.
The most powerful argument that sustains my idea is not
taken from the history of philosophy, does not represent a certain
doctrine, it it History itself. In the last century, mankind has
witnessed some of the most dreadful events that could occur. First,
there were the two World Wars, with their millions of victims, the
Holocaust and the concentrational camps. I’m not blaming anyone,
maybe Jaspers was right when he said that we should all feel that
“metaphysical guilt”, but one thing is for sure: the ones that
committed those acts were not virtuous persons. They used justice in
their own interpretation. I think that in this context it is very
relevant a letter of an young man who died in Auschwitz. He declared
that he was conscious that his life was valuable for others,only as
long as he was sacrificed. His visionary statement, which sends a
shiver down our spines, should remind us that virtue is not
something we need to impose to ourselves, but something that must
come from within.
Leaving the field of history, and going back to philosophy, it was
Immanuel Kant the first one who imagined an institution that
combined both virtue and ethics. He regarded it as a “foedus
pacificum” and it’s role was to strenghten the communication between
countries, in a peaceful manner. Later one, this concept was tried
to be put into practice under the name of the Society of the
Nations, by the american president Woodrow Wilson. But he was blamed
for his idealism and this project failed. The totalitarian regimes
wanted to eliminate every single trace of idealism, of compassion,
of virtue. In my opinion, nowadays philosophy should try to
reintroduce the concept of virtue, or, as Adorno said, of
“sensibility”. Otherwise, its role would eventually turn into a
decorative one.
But
these abusses were already pointed out by the artists. Pablo Picasso
depicted in one of his most known canvas, “Guernica” (1939) the
civil war of the general Franco, and the massacre from a small town
from Spain. The painter was horrified by the fact that this event
had only been mentioned with serenity in a news, like it would have
been a regular one. The artist tried to present the metamorphosis of
the whole world. There are distorted faces, mutilated animals, a
mother screaming for her child. The most powerful element of this
painting is (according to the critics of art), a lightbulb.
Everything happens in the dimension of human madness, of human
despair. There is no moon, no “starry sky above”, no transcendental
element. Just pain, dereliction, and loneliness.
In the end, I think I found out that I do not know if
this link truly exists. But I have already told you that my opinion
is that it should exist. Going back to Kant, as the neokantianists
would suggest, I want to ask myself, “what am I allowed to hope?” –
a world where I could state without a doubt, that there is an
intrinsic relationship between justice and virtue.
Heidy Meriste
Mention
ESTONIA
1.
It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the
foundation of state, the ultimate aim of government is not to rule,
or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to
free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security;
in other words, the strengthen his natural right to exist and work,
without injury to himself and others. (Spinoza,
Theological-Political Treatise, chapter XX)
Imagine there’s no country,
I
wonder if you can?
Nothing to kill or die for,
and
no religion, too.
The
lines above come from John Lennon’s song Imagine. By
imagining a world without country and private property, he suggest
that all the people could live in peace. It isn’t hard to notice the
huge contradiction between what Baruch Spinoza, a philosopher from
ages ago, and John Lennon, an pop artist and idol from 90ies, have
said. Spinoza is suggesting that the reason why we can live in
peace, is that there is a state the provides security, but Lennon is
suggesting that perhaps the world would be better without it. Next,
I am going to search an answer for the question Is democracy*
necessary? by taking into account different aspects and
functions of the state. At first, I am going to compare democracy
with tyranny (like Spinoza did in his argument) and anarchy.
Secondly, I will call his argument into doubt by asking whether
democracy can actually free every man from fear and provide
security. And thirdly, I will discuss whether it is really
the ultimate aim of the state or not.
1.
Democracy, Tyranny, Anarchy...
By
imagining a world without private property, Lennon is not alluding
to communism, because he also discards any kind of country or state.
He suggest an utopia that no-one has ever seen. Spinoza, however,
makes quite clear links with democracy by contrasting it with a
tyranny. He, probably like most of people nowadays as well, though
that democracy is better than tyranny. We might think so, because of
the dreadful things that have taken place in tyrannies, e.g.
Holocaust in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. But if the individual(s) ruling
the country wouldn’t have any bloody intentions, the results might
not be that bad. In Politeia Plato introduces us with his
vision of society ruled by philosophers. The reason why he thought
that this kind of society would be better is that demos is
not good enough to rule the country. The people who rule the country
should be intelligent, not ordinary people who are perhaps more
interested in their own individual good, rather than eudaimonia
for all the people. In contrast, democracy is the rule of majority,
not minority. In a way, it might follow the Utilitarian principle
stated by Jeremy Bentham greatest good for the greatest number.
In this case, I do believe that democracy is better, because if more
people are involved, more views are represented. However, I also
support the restrictions that Mill has suggested, for example,
nobody shouldn’t be sacrificed for the sake of other people.
Minority shouldn’t suffer.
In
tyranny people are hold under the government that is based on the
power of the strong ones and the fear of the defenseless citizens.
So, it can be said that ın tyranny the people are there for the sake
of state. However, ın democracy, it is on the contrary, because the
state is there for the sake of people.
Comparing democracy with anarchy, it also seems better, because in
anarchy everybody will do what he or she wants to do, not taking
into account the pain caused for other people. A rapist would rape,
a murderer would murder. There would be no security. In democratic
countries people seem to be more secure, because people have agreed
with the social contract. But perhaps the state isn’t any better
than church, perhaps democracy is like religion that created an
illusion** that promises Heaven for those who are good and Hell for
those who commit sins? Perhaps democracy doesn’t provide a security,
but just an illusion that we are safe?
2.
Can democracy actually free every man from fear and provide
security?
Spinoza says that the state is there to free every man from fear.
I would dare to call that into question. Although I do believe that
democracy gives most of the people more freedom and more ways to
realize their ideas (as long as they don’t threaten other people’s
security), I don’t really think that it frees us from the fear.
Thomas Hobbes has suggested that contracts are just words that
cannot grant people’s security without the support of the sword.
Though there are many laws that are supposed to protect, I they
don’t actually provide any physical protection. It is still possible
for a murderer to commit dreadful massacres, without any kind of
paper-based contract or moral law stopping him. In fact, the
psychopath might even think that by slaughtering us he would
actually set us free from earthly chains of fear and all the other
bodily passions! Though Plato wasn't a psychopath, his theory of the
Forms would provide a foundation to lean on, because according to
his philosophy the world of Form or Ideas was prior to the sensible
world, the world of objects. Epicurus has said that we don’t have to
fear the death, because there are we, there is no death, and there
is death, we no longer exist. A murderer could use this as a good
justification as well. But the thing is that although the
state cannot guarantee our 100% security, what it can do is to
punish the murderer (assuming the he will be caught...). That is why
we have police and courts. So, perhaps it is not the freedom
that the state provides, but justice?
Of
course it is arguable whether the state actually provides justice or
is this an illusion as well. Some people might suggest that the
legal system doesn’t make the right decisions every time. It is not
impossible that wrong person could be punished for a crime that he
hasn’t committed, as well. However, it seems that the legal system
still works. Or maybe it is the moral law inside us that prevents us
making immoral choices. But I do think that the fear of punishment
does prevent us from committing crimes. For example, normally there
aren’t that many incidences of shop-lifting. But before the
earth-quakes and other catastrophes the number will increase,
because people know that in the situation like that they won’t be
punished. They’ll get away with it, so the law doesn’t stop them.
But
one for sure, we wouldn’t like if somebody else would steal our own
things. As a negative version of the Golden Rule Jesus stated, do
not so this for the other that you don’t want to be done for you.
This is the principle upon which the social contract
(Rousseau) stands. By giving up some right that we would have in
anarchic animal society, we will also gain rights and injustice is
replaced with justice.
3.
What is the ultimate aim of the state?
Going into more depth, it seems almost impossible for me to discard
the matter of ultimate purpose. Spinoza claims that the ultimate
aim of the state is to protect its citizens and provide freedom.
Even if it is not the security, but justice, that the state
promises, it can be asked whether it is really the ultimate purpose?
The state or country consists of 3 main things: people, territory,
and power. Two latter ones are there for the sake of human beings,
but what is the purpose of humanity? If we would claim that society
is there for the sake of people and people are there for the sake of
society, we would end up in a vicious circle.
When reminding Aristotle’s theory of 4 causes, we often encounter
problems with the last one – the Final Cause, because if we ask why
is A there, and we make a conclusion that is there for B, we can
again ask why is B there and say that it is there for C and so on
and so on. So, it seems to me that what Spinoza claims to the
ultimate aim just reflects a superficial point of view. It
doesn’t go into more depth to ask what is the purpose of humanity as
a whole. And to my mind, that is definitely one of the weak points,
because if the humanity wouldn’t have a purpose, the society and
state might lose their justification of existence as well. In some
reason, it is in our nature to ask questions, like a little child
may ask Why? Why? Why? If the knife is there to cut, when
there must always be a person why cuts and eventually we will still
end up with the question about the meaning of life. The fact that
humanity has a meaning can be regarded as an unstated assumption
that Spinoza’s argument lies on. If humanity doesn’t have a purpose,
when the state won’t have a purpose either and the whole argument
would just collapses. Or wouldn’t it?
There are many ways to approach this issue. For example, Aristotle,
as mentioned above, would suggest that there has to be an end for
the chain of questions Why?. There has to be an ultimate end
what he called the Unmoved Mover or the Uncaused Cause. But if there
would be some kind of deity, doesn’t matter whether transcendent of
not, would the state still exist for us, if we would be here because
of something or somebody else? It would be hard to give either a
positive or negative answer.
However, existentialists like might say that life just exists
without a purpose. Russell would say that it is just a brutal
fact that we are here, Camus would describe the universe as an
absurd. However, the lack of external purpose doesn’t
necessarily mean that we cannot have an internal purpose. However,
internal purpose would be a very subjective matter. Looking back on
Spinoza’s argument, although it could be said that the vision of
democracy and just world is typical for the majority, it might not
be self-evident for a psychopath. We might have different internal
purposes. Of course, it might be that the state is there to allow
all of us who we have different aims just to exist together
peacefully and fulfil our purposes. In this case, the humanity as a
whole might not have a purpose, but it might not be a disadvantage,
because differently from the case where we would be here for the
sake of somebody else, and therefore there would have been a
question whether the state is here for the sake of us, we don’t have
that problem any more. In this case, there wouldn’t be a doubt that
the state actually exists for our sake. The lack of external purpose
would be the actual thing that would make us free.
Summary
Eventually, though in part 1 it was justified that democracy seems
to be better than tyranny or anarchy (although in theory a country
ruled by philosophers like Plato would suggest might not be worse
than democracy), in part 2 the conclusion was made that it isn’t
actually the security that it provides, like Spinoza claims, but
justice. A paper-based law doesn’t stop the murderer, but it will
fix a punishment for the murderer to make sure that the order of the
universe is restored.
But
the main question asked when comparing Spinoza’s argument with the
song of John Lennon: Is democracy (state) necessary? is still
left without an answer, because in order talk about the necessity of
the state, we cannot discard the issue about the necessity and
purpose of humanity as a whole that was discussed in part 3. From
this aspect, Spinoza’s argument seems to be superficial, it doesn’t
go in to much depth. As long as this unstated premise (that humanity
does have a purpose) is not proved, Spinoza’s argument might stand
on a brittle grass***.
However, in the end I actually reached to an interesting point: the
lack of external purpose might actually be the main fact that makes
us free. The fact if humanity wouldn’t have an external, but
internal purpose, might strengthen the role of state and government
as a institution for the sake of human beings. In contrast when
there would be some kind other ultimate purpose, it would be
doubtful whether the state is actually there for our own sake or for
the sake of some other higher being.
*
The reason why I have used to word democracy, is that by a proper
state Spınoza seems to understand democracy.
**
I’m not trying to say that religion cannot be valid. This illusion
could be real as well. But in order to make sure whether there is
Heaven or Hell I should die, but I’ve got other things to do.
***
Expression that Shakespeare used when describing the bloody rule of
English king Richard III. Means that the argument doesn’t have
proper foundations.
Luca Vegetti
Mention
ITALY
2)
Dans son Traıté théologıque-polıtıque Spınoza a établı que la
fonctıon de l’Etat n’est pas de opprımer le peuple quı se constıtue
en luı, maıs de sauvegarder les droıts de ceux quı le composent.
Pour pouvoır confırmer cette posıtıon on doıt tout d’abord chercher
á comprendre
quel
est le but pour lequel l’Etat est né; pour faıre celà
une méthode très utıle est celle utılısée par Thomas Hobbes, la
méthode généalogıque. Le faıt que Hobbes arrıve à une conceptıon de
l’Etat autocratıque n’est pas une raıson pour retenır que quıconque
utılıse ce procédé doıt en tırer les mêmes conclusıons du phılosophe
anglaıs. En effets, ce qu’ıl y a de vraıment ımportant dans la
pensée de Hobbes est l’avoır comprıs que l’Etat se constıtue à cause
d’une exıgence humaıne: le besoın d’ordre. L’ordre dans l’Etat est
représenté formellement par l’émanatıon des loı, et je peux affırmer
qu’ıl n’exıste aucun Etat sans loıs. De plus, je peux dıre,
sımplement observant les dıfférentes formes de structures socıales
formées par l’homme, qu’ıl n’est pas possıble aucun type de socıété
sans loıs, et donc que toute forme d’organısatıon humaıne nécéssıte
d’être comprıse dans un Etat.
Etant donné que,
depuıs le debut de l’hıstoıre humaıne, c’est à dıre dès que nous
avons des témoıgnages écrıts, l’homme a toujours montré la tendence
à s’organıser en communautés, on peut retenır aussı que la
constıtutıon d’une socıété cıvıle est une “forma mentıs” de l’être
humaın.
Cela dıt ıl est
naturel de se domander pourquoı l’homme a cette exıgence sı forte et
sı durable (rappelons que jamaıs dans le cours de l’hıstoıre
l’organısatıon socıale a dısparu complètement. En outre selon le
phılosophe françaıs Braudel l’organısatıon socıale humaıne est l’un
des phénomènes à longue durée), ou mıeux quelles sont les exıgences
humaınes prımaıres que nous voulons á tout prıx sauvegarder et que
nous pouvons sauvegarder grace á l’Etat. Hobbes avaıt dıt que la
plus forte, dans l’homme á l’état de nature, est la lıberté de
affırmer sa propre volonté, la lıberté de pouvoır faıre ce que l’on
veut; toutefoıs, exercer cette absolue lıberté conduıt á
l’affırmatıon de la loı du plus fort, á une sıtuatıon ou “homo
homını lupus”, quı est ınacceptable - exactement en fonctıon de
notre “axıome” selon lequel la lıberté ındıvıduelle est la chose la
plus ımportante – parce que la majorıté des hommes voıt sa propre
lıberté lımıtée. Construır un Etat sıgnıfıe, comme je l’aı déjá dıt,
formalıser des normes, quı pour leur nature donnent des droıts maıs
ımposent des devoırs. Autrement dıt l’Etat réduıt la lıberté
ındıvıduelle. Sur la base de cette consıdératıon je sent de pouvoır
affırmer que la lıberté absolue n’est pas la seule valeur
fondamentale, ontologıquement supérıeure, présente dans les hommes
puısque s’ıl étaıt dıfféremment l’Etat de nature auraıt perduré. Il
doıt donc y être quelque chose de plus ımportant pour les hommes.
Il n’a pas sens,
ıcı, de se demander qu’est ce quı peut etre plus ımportant que la
lıberté pour la sımple raıson qu’on ne pourraıt joındre à une
réponse unıtaıre. Comme le dısaıt Wıttgensteın dans son Tractatus,
les questıons quı n’ont pas de sens ne doıvent pas être posées. Je
dıt que trouver la réponse à la précédente questıon est ımpossıble
non plus à cause d’une ıgnorance de l’homme en matıère, maıs parce
que en effet ıl n’y a pas de reponse, sınon la suıvante (quı dıt
tout et, contemporaınement, rıen): l’exıgence de l’homme est de
réalıser soı même.
L’Etat se constıtue
non pour assurer une partıculıère opportunıté aux hommes maıs pour
consentır à chacun-et-à-tous de pouvoır atteındre le but le plus
élevé: soı même. “A chacun-et-à-tous” sıgnıfıe que les hommes dans
une socıété doıvent pouvoır se réalıser tous au même temps, ce quı
ımplıque le non sens du désır de lıberté et de pouvoır absolus. De
celà suıt nécessaırement que l’Etat, le vraı Etat, ne peut pas être
par défınıtıon un système dıspotıque, un absolutısme ou bıen un
totalıtarısme. De plus, sı nous accepton la descprıtıon faıte par
Hannah Arendt du totalıtarısme nous devrıons conclure que cecı est
l’antı-Etat. Il n’est pas, attentıon, un non-Etat, parce qu’ıl est
ımpossıble une organısatıon socıale sı rıgıde au déhors de l’Etat,
maıs ıl est un antı-Etat pour le faıt qu’ıl est une structure du
même type de l’Etat maıs quı poursuıt l’objectıf opposé: la non-réalısatıon
des ınduvıdus au nom de celle de l’Etat même.
Pour retourner à
Spınoza, ce dernıer dıt que l’homme doıt conserver “son droıt
naturel d’exıster et d’agır”. Celà est fondamental: dans une
ınterprétatıon dıfférente, en sens moderne et exıstencıalıste, de
cette affırmartıon on pourraıt dıre que en effet le droıt que
l’homme doıt posséder est celuı de exıster et non plus celuı de être.
L’homme doıt avoır le droıt d’exıster (assuré par l’Etat) sı on
accepte la conceptıon Sartrıenne selon laquelle l’exıstence précède
l’essence. J’explıque: sı l’être humaın avaıt une essence commune
ındıvıduable par quelqu’un, alors ıl seraıt justıfıé de constıtuer
un Etat quı a comme seul but la préservatıon de l’ıntégrıté de cette
esence, même à coût de utılıser des moyens de coercıtıon, , même à
coût de dıscrımıner ceux quı, ne se rendant pas comt de la supposée
vraıe essence humaıne, ne suıvent pas le comportement commun des
autres. La conceptıon de l’Etat de Hobbes, exprımée dans Le
Lévıathan, naît du faıt que le phılosophe anglaıs concevaıt la
sureté et la vıe – bıologıque – comme des valeurs ıntrınsèques à
l’essence humaıne que l’Etat doıt préserver en opprımant les
cıtoyens aussı (même sı ıl n’auraıt probablement pas exprımé ce
concept avec ces mots).
Sı par contre nous
ne cherchons aucune essence humaıne, et nous acceptons que chaque
homme se faıt par ses maıns tel qu’ıl se veut dans l’exıstence,
après avoır exısté, alors nous assumons comme seule condıtıon que
l’Etat doıt preserver la réalısatıon personnelles des ındıvıdus. On
pourraıt dıre que à nouveau ıl y a une valeur supérıeure, au nom de
laquelle l’Etat pourraıt devenır un “Lévıathan”, maıs cela n’a pas
de sens, puısque l’Etat se forme, dans ce cas, exactement pour
sauvegarder les caractérıstıques des dıfférentes exıstences, pour
n’être pas un Lévıathan.
Vu que les hommes
sont tous dıfférents et contınuent à naître dıfférents, ıl est
oblıgatoıre de reconnaître qu’ıls pensent et agıssent dıfféremment
sur la base d’une moltıtude de valeurs, au poınt ou ıl devıent
ımpossıble d’établır une morale unıverselle, comme le voulaıt Kant.
Postuler l’exıstence d’une telle morale contredıt évıdemment les
faıts que nous voyons dans le monde: ıl n’exıstent pas deux personne
quı ont la même morale (ıl en exıstent, par contre, beaucoup quı ont
des morales semblables maıs pas égales). La reconnaıssance du
rélatıvısme éthıque s’ımpose ıcı.
On pourraıt
objecter que sı vraıment “l’homme est mesure de toutes le choses”,
comme le dısaıt Protagora, chacun pourraıt prétendre d’ınstıtuır un
Etat selon sa propre conceptıon polıtıque et ensuıte chercher à
ımposer sa vısıon aux autres. Toutefoıs l’acceptatıon sıncère du
subjectıvısme, la vérıtable ıntérıorısatıon la plus haute de ce
concept porte à reconnaître la valıdıté des opınıons de tout le
monde. C’est cette ıdée qu’on doıt transférer en polıtıque, et
l’Etat quı en dérıve est celuı authentıquement démocratıque, la
démocratıe représentatıve.
Maıs pourquoı ce
type d’organısatıon est la meılleure? Je trouve que Kelsen l’a dıt
de façon excellente, en ındıvıduant le coeur du problème: sı on
concevoıs la vérıté comme unıque, donnée une foıs pour toute l’Etat
que nous voulons est de type autocrathıque, même sı nous le voulons
pas admettre. Sı par contre nous dérıvons la notıon de vérıté de la
vısıon crıtıcıste et réletıvıstıque de la scıence, alors la
démocratıe se pose comme l’unıque model d’Etat quı a la possıbılıté
de sauvegarder la multıplıcıté des valeurs exıstantes. Pour
explıquer pourquoı la démocratıe et pas un autre ınstıtutıon
polıtıque ıl pourraıt être utıle une consıdéraratıon sur le terme
“démocratıe”. Sı on la concevoıs dans le strıcte sens étymologıque
elle est le gouvernement du peuple; cette défınıtıon est
ınacceptable parce que sı elle étaıt applıquée aux socıétés
contemporaınes, quı sont massıfıées, la démocratıe devıendraıt le
gouvernement de la foule quı emporte tous les délıres que nous
connaıssons grace à la lıttérature (ıl suffıt de penser aux
“Epıstolae morales ad Lucılıum” de Seneca, ou bıen aux “Fıancés” de
Manzonı); maıs sı on adopte la défınıtıon donnée par Dahrendorf
selon laquelle: “La démocratıe est la possıbılıté de changement sans
révolutıon” alors on peut comprendre que ce type d’organısatıon
polıtıque est superıeur aux autres parce qu’ıl consent des
mutatıons à l’ıntérıeur de la socıété quı ne comportent pas la
vıolence, la coercıtıon et l’oppressıon (c’est pour celà que le
phılosophe spécıfıe “sans révolutıon”) maıs quı ont la faculté de
pouvoır transformer en loı les synthèses dıaléctıques – en sens
Hegelıen – entre le dıfférentes posıtıons des cıtoyens. La
démocratıe assure à la socıété la possıbılıté de toujours trouver ce
que Paul Rıcoeur défınıt “le juste moyen”. Maıs, en effets, la
démocratıe est elle même un “juste moyen”, quı se trouve entre les
deux extrêmes représentés par le totalıtarısme et l’anarchıe.
J’aı dıt que
Spınoza proposaıt un Etat dans lequel l’homme puısse vıvre sans
craınte, sans dommage pour autruı et en exerçant le droıt d’exıster
et d’agır, j’aı dıt que, au jour d’aujourd’huı, cet Etat doıt être
démocratıque maıs ıl y a encore une cosıdératıon fondamentale à
faıre: sı l’Etat se formalıse en un ensemble de loı, ıl ne peut pas
être seulement celà. Les loıs peuvent être concevues comme des
régles ou mıeux des axıomes établıs par l’hommes, maıs depuıs 1931,
année dans laquelle Goedel a démontré son deuxıème théorème sur les
sytèmes axıomatıques, comment pouvons nous ne pas douter de tels
systèmes? Nous savons de ce théorème que, établıs des axıomes, ıl y
aura toujours une proposıtıon ındémontrable sur la base des axıomes
mêmes. Dans le cas du systême de loı d’un Etat on peut dıre qu’ıl y
aura toujours un cas, une sıtuatıon partıculıère que les loıs ne
prévoıent pas. Cecı est un lımıte structural des Etats, quı oblıge à
ıntroduıre le très ambıgu concept de “bon sens”: seulement avec le
bon sens on peut décıder comment construır et faıre vıvre une
démocratıe, pour qu’elle ne trahı ses propres prıncıpes et pour
qu’elle puısse se rapporter de façon correcte même avec les “cas
partıculıers”. Avec “bon sens” j’ındıque la capacıté des ındıvıdus
de juger quelle est la morale commune (maıs absolument pas
unıverselle), la sensıbılıté face aux problèmes fondamentaux de la
mojorıtés des gens selon laquelle on peut orıenter les décısıons
ımportantes quı concernent les “cas partıculıers”.
Pour qu’on puısse
exercer le bon sens ıl y a una condıtıon quı doıt toujours être
respectée dans la socıété, condıtıon ındıvıduée par Hannah Arendt
comme fondamentale pour l’exıstence de la démocratıe: la présence
d’un espace publıc.
Sans un espace publıc oú
tout le monde peut se confronter,
oú le bon sens peut naître, les loıs, les règles de l’Etat et de la
socıété sont stérıles, ne produısent pas les résultats qu’on veut
voır de ces mêmes.
Je fınıt en faısant
une précısatıon: au début j’aı dıt qu’ıl n’y a pas des valeurs vraıs
a-prıorı que l’Etat doıt défendre, maıs l’ınstıtutıon d’un Etat est
fonctıonnelle à la sauvegarde de l’exıstence des hommes
(c’est-à-dıre à leur ındıvıdualıté). Soulıgné cet aspect, je doıs
quand même dıre qu’ıl y a des règles que la démocratıe doıot
toujours faıre respecter: ce ne sont pas des règles métaphysıquement
valıdes, maıs seleument des normes quı dérıvent de la coérence
logıque:
-
sı
l’Etat quı peut garantır l’ındıvıdualıté des hommes au mıeux est la
démocratıe, ıl est fondamental qu’elle ne puısse jamaıs être
convertıe en autres formes de gouvernement
-
sı
l’Etat est protecteur de l’exıstence des hommes, ıl est nécessaıre
que les hommes exıstent physıquement, donc l’Etat doıt
chercher toujours à préserver la vıe des cıtoyens
-
sı
pour l’homme exıster sıgnıfıe aussı réalıser soı même, l’Etat doıt
actıvement donner la possıbılıté que celà arrıve, en
favorısant la présence d’un espace publıc quı puısse entraîner la
maxımale lıberté de pensée.
Bernàt Ivàncsics
Mention
Hungary
There are two
things, that fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration
and awe... the starry sky above me and the moral law within me
– Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason)
Morality shaped
by the moulds of mind – what is morality anyway?
Reflecting on
the state of ethics drawn up by the discourses of philosophy, one
has the impression that each philosopher engaged with ethics had
already known or possessed a specific and personal notion of
morality where each of their discourses started of. The question
therefore can be put: are ethics competent within the margins of
human thinking, or are we dealing with beliefes. To launch a
commonplace here: are we ever going to know what is right or what is
wrong, and do we need this distinction; is human happines a result
of morality, and consequently: can human happines be imagined
without morality. What is happines anyway? Calmness and apathia, or
a dynamical and perpetual rise-followed-by-descent of the soul in
human life?
The question
arises: can morality be defined logically, can it be derived form
pure understanding and consideration, therefore: are ethics possibly
examined by philosophy? If so, how are moral laws going to be handy
for us to use, how are these going to fit us, human beings?
I.
Several
discourses on Kant’s moral law after his Critique of Practical
Reason being published contained a sour rejection of it reffering to
his idea of moral law nested in duty. It is too rigorous, and
for an individual (as a human being who inherited not only a healthy
reason but a body too “hosting” the mind) it is not acceptable, too
complicated anyway – complicated considering the intense mental scan
before every each of our acts we are up to. From many aspects,
Kant’s notion of morality is fairly abstract, but taking this
adjective here: abstract, into consideration, we have already gained
our keyword to describe and apprehend what Kant really meant. His
morality rooted in the critque of practical reason already
presumes this abstraction, because Kant in his monumental work
drafted the most purest idea of morality, based in the logically
thinking mind (reason).
Kant rejects
utilitarism, since the engine of moral acts must not be a pace of
general goods or possessions of the indivudal people or the state as
a whole (J. Bentham, Helvetius). He distinguishes two types of
connections or attitudes with the outer world, our acts, and our
life – thus two types of “mentality” and morality. The first one is
the individual mostly reigned by his instincts, his eternal seek for
pleasure. But such individual is not living its life in autonomy,
and will not fully be hold of itself, that is why Kant – it’s
important here: the major explorer and critical of mind, of our a
priori cathegories - prefers autonomy, the morality not persuaded or
empirically determined, but which is manifested under the genuine
and considerate supervision of mind, reason. His morality would not
accept acts mobilized by love or hate. We must act as if following a
rule which could be streched out onto every thinking person,
considering our acts as the source of good.
Therefore
Kant’s ethics are not consequentual ethics, for whatever the result
of our acts are they must be considered from the aspect of purpose
or intention distillated from emotions – and this is duty.
The quotation refers to Kant’s acceptance of natural laws, but on
the other hand we must not forget that our will is always going to
be free. Hesitating before an act, or to be more authentic: before a
good deed, we must “utilize” our moral law, and only later,
bypassing the consequences of our act, are we able to place our
deeds into a historical process and determine them as evident
results of – for example – specific culture, age, community etc.
Naturally, determinists would shake their heads here, considering
human being totally entangled in its engulfing environment, thus the
will totally dependent from it. Kant’s freedom is inevitable in his
theory, it is us, who choose. It is our choice to live in an
autonomy, to live freely, devoted to good, not following pleasure
itself, but considering our deeds, whether they are adequate or not,
but again, us not being permanently filled with ourselves: even
though Kant’s moral law denies emapthy towards other people, or any
feelings, but this does not mean that personally only I am important
constantly for myself. This has nothing to do with conscience for
example.
Our revision
of our acts and purposes is a collective thinking, a collective
discourse on good deeds, which is never to be ended in the future
anymore.
II.
Parallel to Kant’s discourse on moral law, a certain mentality of
the middle class (specifically: citizens living in an urban
background) in the period of the age took shape. Kant’s thesis on
morality was a genuine aspect considering such problems compared to
former utilitarist theories. To be considerate: Kant’s platform
where he started off was already somehow determined by the battle
between the racionalists and empirist camp; but not just due to them
had Kant needed to take a step forward, rather due to a wider
philosophical context present in the meantime. For Kant, reason
became a very strong authority, and from this can his “awe” be
derived.
Kant’s
morality distillated from whirling emotions is rather comfortable.
However, mostly the strictness and paleness had been transfered to
this mentality along with a renewal of the importance of results
following our acts as well. We luckily have an (although a rather
narrow, but again very authentic) outlook on such mentality of the
contemporary society fidgeting just at the front door of the second
(or whatever which) industrial revolution from monumental works of
German literature. Goethe’s Doctor Faustus and his contract with the
devil illustrates a somewhat clear situation of choice to be
bypassed. It is either the choice of the strict rules and the
comfortable life of middle class though boring and
motionless, or the life of uncontrolled hedonism. And Faustus’
choice was the latter. Not just that such “lifestyle” is boring, but
also not being frank to human nature creates a true conflict amongst
citizenship, amongst everyone.
Anyway, is our
mind the only jury of our deeds? It is an interesting problem to
come across, why actually a positivist attitude grasped the
mentality of the modern eurolit today. However, today’s desperate
search for scientific answeres and the mentality actually in hold of
this process (which – to make a short consequence – just feeds
itself on and on) stems from much earlier times.
The question
must be put reffering to this state of being of the human nature not
being honest to its nature - mentioned a few lines above. This also
means a certain loss of freedom. How, if we have managed to get
independent of our instincts?
Nietzsche
first of all, while criticizing the Western-European culture
saturated with an optimistic and devoted mentality towards human
intellect, also - though very radically - demands a sharp turn back
to where we have come from: our original state of being in our
nature (Born of Tragedy). This does not mean a direct move out into
the forests, rather (to try and draft a possible practical lesson of
his artistic works) an honest supervision of our nature and not
suppressing any originality: thus the attributes of a human being
generally created out of flesh and life must remain. Such
discourse was against religion, qualifying all worshipers as a flock
of sheep, but it is not really against conservativism for example;
or to be more precise it does not reject any values as far as these
values origin from the basic human nature. Because the wide class of
peaceful people may also be a tyranny from the aspect of a genuine
person trying to realize himself, as an individual, but always
facing a strengthful crowd of people.
III.
[Conclusions and some remarks]
The problem of
ethics is tightly entangled in the problem of freedom as well. If we
start to try and live in a certain autonomy, always intending to be
good and by our acts to choose the best solution – best in
the means of being the most appropriate, the solution which could be
declaried even as a law for everyone in the same situation –, can we
actually call ourselves free enough? On the other hand, do not we
forget our origins, our state of being a natural being, human being.
It is evident,
however, for an individual thrown into cultural and social
circumstances and states, that a very clear-minded dialogue must
take place. As individuals, we may face socitey as an oppression
against our personal freedom, but we have to make it clear, the
cultural, social etc. background too had let us develop. We live in
a society, we accept the rules, our life is formed through society,
and collective life oozes into our private life. However, we must
not forget where we are from, we must be able to imagine our life
independent from the background of collectivism, because otherwise
we get dissolved into a collective and general life, and we get to
think as general, we became general.
One’s
responsibility must rely on deliberateness of one’s acts, and a
constant reflection on the background as well, constant supervison
of oneself to make sure where the Pole Star is on the starry sky
above us.
Cristoph Schachenhofer
Mention
AUSTURIA
Topic Nr. 1
Spinoza / Theological Political Treatise
Spinoza`s quote deals with the role of the state in the individual`s
life. He states, that it`a primarly aim is to free its civilians
from fear, so they can live as free and peaceful as possible and not
injure themselves or others. During the following essay I would like
to deal with the general topic of `the state` by examining it`s
history and then question, wether Spinoza`s ideas are still true
today or if history and our momentary situation contradict them.
One
of the basic things to do, when dealing with Spinoza`s quote, is, of
course, defining the way the term `state` is used in the following
text. `State`, always associated with power, is, as far as I am
concerned, pretty different to locate (I witnessed this in recent
times, when talking to a marxist, who said, "we have to do away with
the state", and I asked him "well, what is this concrete that you
want to attack?", he could not tell me). I doubt, that a state is
only a government of a nation, that the power of the state is not
clearly to be personified, but exists in a pretty complex system of
politics, society, even economy, which all work together and
influence each other in a very special way. Another definition would
be, that society is the core anyway that produces all forms of
politics, economy, mass media and so forth.
The
main point of Spinoza is that the state should rule and restrain its
citizens with fear.
I
would interpret the historic development of the state as a process
of civilization. During the Middle Ages, when a small population was
spread over vast distances and held together in very small
communities, the fear of being affected by outside violence was
omni-present. A farmer was always in danger to be attacked during
night or robbed on his way to a near village. This changed rapidly
when the population density increased, the smaller communities were
absorbed by bigger ones and new economic strategies strenghened the
bond between the people (for example the job sharing, where suddenly
a worker depended on many others who delivered him certain special
parts or the raw material for his work, which would all together
lead to a product, which again he had to sell via a merchant in the
towns, so the interdependence of people grew). As the
interdependency becomes more complex, the community has to put more
pressure on the individual to not destroy this by sudden emotional
outbreaks, by disturbing others or even attacking them. Special
codes of behavior, language and so forth have to be set up, because
more and more people have to work or interact with each other, which
is only possible, if they share a certain basis, which is built by
behavioral instructions. This increases during the 16th and 17th
century and is again paralleled by a strong concurrence of
communities. The struggle between these lead to bigger ones, which
actually lead to the building of the modern nations and states.
So,
after all, the state (the various forms of communities in history)
really had to keep the individuals from being bodily violated, so
they could build up this complex system of interaction, which still
grows today - and probably even faster than before, because of new
media like Internet.
On
the other hand, the community - and a state is just one form of it -
always also has to rule on its citizens, since it has to make them
follow the `rules of the game`. Laws from the states and certain
codes from society indeed rule the individual to a big extent. Even
an ordinary conversation is mostly just controlling each other by
both partners, each one keeping the other in a generally accepted
way of thinking - so the society`s codes, which also include topics,
points of views etc. - by using standard-phrases, -questions and
-topics and by showing the other one immediately a deep missfortune,
if a more crucial topic is being touched.
Although the physical fear may decrease in a state, the pschological
fear does certainly increase. There are so many codes and rules that
the individual is in a constant doubt wether it does, says,
probably even thinks in the right - meaning the general accepted -
way, it has to fear rejection of its social surrounding, which can
even lead to bodily violence (just think of society`s
differentiation into `normal` and `mad`, for a very long time the
ones who were declared mad had to suffer heavy physical pains, when
they were treated with electro-shocks and stuff like that). Even if
the rejection of an individual by society does not end in physical
aggression, it is a severe punishment. It is generally known that
people who are isolated from their social surroundings, who lack of
acquaintences and systems like family, friend- and relationships,
are more easily affected by illness and even die earlier than
others. So the fear from being ostracized is a very grave one and
soziologists like Norber Elias showed, that the ongoing process of
civilization also leads to a heavier psychological weight on the
individual.
So
therefore I would contradict Spinoza, in so far as the state - a
pretty complex system - has to put the human being into fear, it is
actually an essential part of the state itself, because only the
fear of probably being expelled from this community makes the
individual fully accept the community`s codes (and also sets the
need into the individual to fulfill these codes, so pressure,
initially put on it from outside, now comes from within), which
again are the conditions which make community possible.
I
would also question the possibility of individuality in a state.
Since a state has to control its citizen to a very big extent (as
just shown above), it is very hard to be an `authentic individual`,
because a person always has to comply with its surroundings, which
is society, which is the state. A person is educated in a certain
way - which is one generally accepted way, that might change at
times, but there is always one way of educating the child, which is
a la mode, in the first half of the 20th century for example it was
a very authoritarian way, which was answered during the late sixties
by a concept of education that relied on freedom of the child and
avoiding to be authoritarian.
There is a language, in which the new born is thrown and which
determines his or her thinking to a big extent.
And
there is - which is probably the main point - the society, the
civilized, which means very complex, which again means very
organized and rigid society. I do not think, that one is very free
in the form of existence nowadays. One probably has a few choices
(go to work, or study, study natural science or the humanities,...),
but these are just little variations of a single, general way of
life, which is set up by society (so it can function anyway).
Spinoza himself states it, it is the "natural right to work", but
this is the first rule, the state puts upon the individual.
So
what about the "natural right to exist"? Is it the right TO exist?
In this case it is no right, because no human being is able to
decide wether he or she is to be born or not. Probably - one might
argue - a human being can decide on wether existence or not, by
comitting suicide or not, but I think this is of no importance,
since there is nothing like a specific existence, meaning a way of
life, which is truly individualistic. Once a human being is born, it
is thrown into a society, it has no possibility to choose HOW to
exist, because it has to fulfill the needs and demands of this
society, so therefore it has to comply with them, it has to go to
kindergarten and then to school (although it can make some
decisions, depending on the school-system) then go to work, then -
also at an age that is set by the state - can retire. What remains
is the fact of existence, but the possibilities of how to live this
life are pretty small, narrowed down or determined by society.
Spinoza himself gives another example of how the state rules on its
citizens. The state should strenghten the right to exist, "without
injury to himself and others." This is exactly the point, were all
the ruling of the state comes in again, because the laws are there
to save somebody from being injured and also to injure another
citizen of himself, and this has to be founded on some definition of
what is the injury like. So the state has to define this, before
turning it into a law. These prohibitions increase in recent times,
which is a frightening example for the growing impact of the state
on an individual`s life. A government does rule on every man, by
saying you are not allowed to smoke in certain areas, you are not
allowed to drink alcohol under a certain age, and so forth. In all
these cases, the state rules on the individual, and I think these
are very grave interventions into anybody`s life.
In
actual fact, I would conclude, that the state`s aim is not to free
the individual, but that it is one of the constituing facts of a
state, to rule upon its citizens. Once more I would emphasize on the
definition of state, of not seeing only a government behind the term
`the state` but the whole complex of society in all its forms, with
all of its variatons, of which a government is only the product.
Since society is the assemble of a vast quantity of individual human
beings, it needs certain parameters that everybody shares, which are
achieved by a process of civilization. These parameters (codes of
language, behaviour, etc.) are held up by constant controll - the
laws of the state ( f.e. certain believes are forbidden in some
contries, so the state tells his citizens, at least to some extent,
what to think), the control of an individual by others (during a
conversation,...) and, last but not least, by the individual itself.
This is the most interesting point, because the individual human
being takes over the pressure to fulfill certain parameters and now
produces this pressure automatically (to say and do the right thing
in the right situation). Power and control settled, where the human
being though to be most sovereign - in its own consciousness and
reflexive thinking.
Nanako Kurioka
Mention
Japan
When We are the Government
1.
“It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the
foundation of state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to
rule or restrain, by fear, nor to exact obediene, but contrariwise,
to free everyman from fear, that he may live in all possible
security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to exist
and work, without injury to himself and others” - Spinoza
Government, ah, the government – the most mysterious and
troublesome problem of a nation. “It (the just state) is only
possible when kings are philosophers and philosophers are king” once
said Plato. When it comes to government, most of us, probably all
of us has a word or two to complain about our government, and all
other governements around the globe. In this international society,
having a government that can indeed govern its country well decides
whether that country can survive the universal competition of
survival.
Spinoza argues that what the function of the government
is not to oppress its people into submission, but to free them from
such loads and allow them to live like a human being should: with
his legitimate right to fulfil his life. But to what extend then,
should the government interfer? Or even before that, is such state
should be the aim of the government? What is government?
What is often expected from a government is to protect
people from danger, guard their rights, and provide them with work,
food and comfort. It is the core of the society, it is where the
people expect their hopes to be turned into reality. But the truth
is, not one government can ever become all-perfect. What is more, I
think the biggest problem of having a government, is that it is
self-destructive. The government that may lead the country to
victory in war will be seen as barbarous in a peaceful society, and
the government that provided safety and support during a rapid
development will become just frustrating and bossy when the country
flourishes and no longer needs a specific guidance as to where to go
next. Therefore, even though the government may seem to be perfect
for the situation now, once that state is fulfilled, people will
start to see the flaws and mistakes of the government.
Here, I would like to introduce a possible way of
thinking about how the government changes, based on George Orwell’s
novel “Nineteen-Eighty-Four”. Usually, in a society, there are a
group of people who has the power of the nation, who runs the
government and controls what it does. There are also the people who
are living on the edge of life, barely have enough to live each
day. Then there are others who exist in between the two groups.
The people who are at the top, therefore, the ones who has the
power, is keen not to lose that status, because of the luxuries of
having a merialisitc life is too addictive. Yet, of course there
are faults in the system, and social problems that need sorting. A
goup of people will then huddle and warm their views, and indeed,
many do have zeal and passion to make the world a better place.
They would probably suffer from many backlashes, but ho, the call of
their utopia drives them through the wind and the rain. Gradually,
their ideas may start to persuade people, especially the
discriminated and oppressed, to change their mind in favour of such
group. After elections after elections, finally, the little group
turns into a political party, and eventually wins over the majority
of the Parliament. Then, the rest is all down fall. The power is
too attractive and addictive, that they do not want to let go. A
group of people will become oppressed by the governing foce, and the
citizens will grow unhappy with the flaws that the government is
acting as if it cannot see, and the repetitive mistakes will
inevitably lose to function purely for the need of people. Even
though there are many other ways for a party to become a governing
force, in a nutshell, power is always a serious problem. Therefore
we need a government that will not be blinded by power, a Party that
are formed by good thinkers. Perhaps in such a moder society, the
monarchy of kings is somewhat out of date, but having the leaders to
become philosophers and philosophers as leaders, as Plato argues, is
a very effective way to acheieve a just state.
A nation, on the other hand, needs stability and order.
It is interesting that Spinoza specifies that the government should
not aim to “restrain, by fear”, because it was one of the main ways
a governing force tried to control its people so many times in the
course of history. In the past, there were some extreme government
that pushed fear to its limits. For example, in the Soviet Union,
people will driven to do as they are told from the fear of being
killed, having their loved ones and loved places destroyed, and
tortured so grusomely that they felt throwing away their rights and
pride as humans are a better solution than resisting. It was
exactly the state that Spinoza is counterarguing for, therefore it
is the ultimate state the government should despise and detest. But
it is a state that the government can so easily have a tendancy
towards: to rob people of their freedom, to stop people from
speaking, and even from thinking. Actually, the Chinese Cultural
Revolution is also such example, because it tried to eliminate
people who can think against the government, so that the stability
of the government is guaranteed. Of course, the surviving
documents, journals and accounts clearly show that people were not
given the right to think, which is the one and only unique gift that
are given to human beings. In a sense, I think they were treated
like animals, as if the government was rinning a farm, but the
problem is, some people could not even realize that they are being
de-humanized, and was completely obedient to the leaders. But all
the same, most totalitarian states did not last long, because, as
Lord Acton puts it, “Power tends to corrupt, absolute power corrupts
absolutely”, and the corrupted government will sooner or later kill
itself from it. I say this because a corrupted system will start to
fail to function properly, cause disatisfaction among the citizens,
and gives them the reason to unite against the governing force and
replace it anew.
Then, how to obtain stability, which is ultimately
peace, as well as order without driving the people with fear, needs
to be questioned. Why don’t I commit a crime? Why do I know it is
wrong? Other than the fact that ever since my childhood, I have
been taught that harming another is evil, I cannot deny the fact
that I do fear the punishment that awaits me if I do. For example,
how about committing something minor, such as parking my bicycle in
front of a building where I am not supposed to. I am probably in
the way of people trying to get in, but on the whole, I am not
harming somebody else. Still, the reason I do not take the chance
to park there is because I know I will be fined if I do. It is the
fear of violating the law that drives me away from committing a
crime. Yet is that the only thing? I suppose the anwer is no,
because I feel I have a duty as one citizen of the city to keep the
rules and laws that are set, since they are probably there for a
reason. Just as I do not want people to do so in front of my
house. However, no doubt, there are people who do not care about
things like parking a bicycle, and only does not park there because
they fear they will be fined. The law, then, is not necessarily
only punishing the crime committers, but prevents the would-be
criminals from acting, but through fear. With so many people in a
nation, I am skeptic about a government freeing everyone from fear,
as Spinoza argues. The government needs the support of its people.
Without it, people will not have any faith in the government, which
means it cannot save or protect anybody, at anytime. It needs to
make people follow certain laws and rules in order to give equal
chances to all, and give them justice. Otherwise, people will barge
into queues without waiting for their turn in lines, they will start
to act as they wish including comming crimes, and therefore, the
state of the nation will become chaotic. The natural right to
exist, is in danger.
To what extend though, is “his natural right”? Of
course, the famous “I think therefore I am” can be used to argue
that we all exist, and therefore has a right to keep existing, it is
the freedom that should not be robbed by any other being or power.
One could say that it is the right to eat, to drink, to sleep, to
laugh, to cry, to live and many more. I think the natural right is
to think. The government should give us freedom to think for
ourselves, to act on our own accord, and to find happiness.
However, I am not sure to how a man can exist without being
controlled by the government in one way or another. What is a
“right”? I think a right is what guarantees what makes of you,
something that everyone, or a group of people acknowledges as
proper, and you are given it to make your life better. At the same
time, it is something precious but vulnerable, that needs constant
care. A right can be easily be overlooked and be a victim of
ignorance. I also think that such rights, protects the very core of
human life, because without it, people are not given the option to
resist anything; it is the foundation of our thoughts and of
morality. Therefore, a “right” turns a human being from an animal
to a social being, and allows him to think – a process that forms
the very base of life. Therefore, I agree with Spinoza that the
government has a duty to protect our rights as a human being,
because the right to exist is not only talking about the right to
live physically, but to truly become a human being with a heart and
a mind, to distinguish myself from all other animals on earth.
However, there is a problem with to what extend the
right could be protected. Spinoza does say that “without injury to
himself and others”, but what happens to a murder who is waiting for
the verdict? Is capital punishment wrong then? Should the murder
be allowed to live because he has a right to exist, presumably in
prison, even though he (in this case, I am not referring to the
gender but as a human being) has just robbed another persons life?
Even he is to be prisoned for life, consequently, he is being robbed
of his right to work. It could be argued that the person should be
robbed of at least some of his right, because he has destroyed the
possibilities of all other rights of the victim. Yet who is
legitimate to draw the line to rob of which right? Also, if he is
not sentenced to life, or by chance, his verdict allows him to
return to the society once more, what punishment will be appropiate
if he commits murder again? Thus, there is a never ending conflict
between the rights themselves. Hutcheson said that “The action
which procures the greatest happiness of greatest number of people”,
but that means that the happiness of that murder, and perhaps of his
family, is not fulfilled. Furthermore, it is up to the government
to decide what to do with the murderer, whose security it should
protect.
Also, it is a matter of discussion about the extent of
interferance by the government. If the government interfers too
much, it will be exploiting its power over us and takes away our
right to do as we think, but if they do nothing, then there is no
point of having a government altogether. One could just conclude
that it is the balance that matters, but how to find that balance,
is a delicate question. Frankly, I do not think that the balance
would just have to change accordingly to the situation. That is why
a good relationship between the government and the citizens is
essential. The government is somewhat a unique system in our
society, because even though it is formed by people like you and I,
it still has its own characteristics, it could so easily create a
huge gap between the people and the rulers. I think one such
example is the relationship between the Bush Administration and the
Americans. Now that there are so many casualties of American
soldiers and Iraqi soldiers and citizens, people are keen to draw
out of Iraq. The reason why they cannot is because the government
is not truly listening to the people’s voice, or only listening to
the ones they want to. The communication between the rulers and the
ruled are vital for an ideal state, because the ruled should always
be able to overthrow the rulers, so that the government is always
function for the better of the nation, not ignore what the people
say and continue using force against another country.
However, the important point for an ideal government to
be obtained is for governments around the world to also do the
same. I say this because if a government frees peole from fear, and
protect the right to exist and work without injury to anyone, that
ultimately means war is not worthy. Yet unless the other nations
demilitarize as well, it will be the victim of a nation of extreme
power, who wants to exploit the nation and rule it. Ruling means
the destruction of that nation’s freedom. That, then, would mean
the government has failed to protect the nation from danger.
Yet I think the way that the government may be able to
free people from fear itself, is by making them act according to
their responsibilities. Sartre says that “Man is alone, abandoned
on earth in his infinite responsbilities”, and I do think that that
realization is the key to a freedom from fear. Of course, Sartre’s
argument is that man is not completely free, and I agree so. We are
never free, there are various duties that we forges for ourselves,
and chain ourselves to tasks and responsibilities that we know not
of. In that sense, Rousseau’s “Man is born free, but everywhere he
is in chains” becomes valid as well. However, I do not think having
responsibilities is not a negative thing, as long as there are no
negative feelings about it. What I mean is that even though we may
not be a hundred-percent free, if we are free from fear, we are able
to live as a proper citizen.
All in all, I do agree with Spinoza that the government
should always aim to strengthen people’s natural right to think for
ourselves, and do accordingly. Even though as human beings, we tend
to be corrupted and make many mistakes, I think there is still hope
in the future, we still have the right, and in fact, the duty, to
hope for the better, to always aim high, even it seems impossible.
Nonetheless, as for freeing people from fear, I do not think people
will ever be free even if we are to live in a perfect nation. The
task of the government is to free the people from fear as much as
possible, even though a compete freedom is probably not realistic.
I think the idea government, is not a proper government at all, it
should always be open and easily affected by its people and not
overpowered by a specific thought. The power of the government
should always be purely provided by the people each moment, so that
the relationship of the ruled and the rulers are flexible. For that
to happen, we must realize what it means to have a right to exist,
the duty that would come from that right. Unfortunately, there are
too many governments that are deceiving its people, and so many of
them are turning away from what its main function should be. The
point of having the government, is to give us the right to exist,
which is the freedom to think. It is not only the government who
has a problem; we too, must realize that having this precious
ability to think means we must take part in the action that the
nation is going through.
There are responsibilities beyond just voting and
discussions over a drink or two. People must realize that they are
part of the government as well, even though it is not so clear-cut
today. No one should be purely recessive against a government, nor
should be ignorant enough to think it has nothing to do with
oneself. Therefore the ideal state would be when we are the
government, and the government is us, and that is what we must aim
at.